Simple, secure, and lightweight mechanism for mutual authentication of nodes in tiny wireless sensor networks

Abstract

Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are widely used in large areas of applications; due to advancements in technology, very tiny sensors are readily available, and their usage reduces the cost. The mechanisms designed for wireless networks cannot be implied on networks with tiny nodes due to battery and computational constraints. Understanding the significance of security in WSNs and resource constraintness of tiny WSNs, we propose a node authentication mechanism for nodes in wireless sensor networks to avoid security attacks and establish secure communication between them. In the proposed mechanism, a base station (BS) generates a secret value and random value for each sensor node and stores at the node. The sensor node authenticates using secret value and random number. Random nonce ensures freshness, efficiency, and robustness. The proposed mechanism is lightweight cryptographic, hence requires very less computational, communication, and storage resources. Security analysis of the proposed mechanism could not detect any security attack on it, and the mechanism was found to incur less storage, communication, and computation overheads. Hence, the proposed mechanism is best suitable for wireless sensor networks with tiny nodes. K E Y W O R D Smathematical mechanism, cryptographic, node authentication, tiny nodes, wireless sensor networks

Secure-user sign-in authentication for IoT-based eHealth systems

“…Traceability The existing authentication protocols [16,19,20] cannot offer a reliable feature of traceability as the pseudo-identities are known to the communication network. However, the proposed S-USI can compute the real identities of client/server to protect the pseudonym identities when M d ∕M s derives the anonymity function using key = PRF S k (H(I d )) ⊕ H � (S k 0 ) .…”

“…The Eqs. (15) and (16) hold owing to A Rule of Key Freshness ⟨I R6 , I R7 ⟩ and BAN Logic Assumption ⟨A⟩ 4 . To achieve the Eq.…”

“…In the S-USI scheme, three message rounds are considered such as M sg1 = ⟨P 1 , P 2 , TS 1 ⟩ , M sg2 = ⟨Q 1 , Q 2 , TS 2 ⟩ and ⟨R, H⟩ to transmit between U ser and R S . Thus, the total communication cost of the proposed S-USI scheme is carefully computed: ⟨320 + 320 + 160 + 160⟩ = 960 bits in comparison with other existing authentication schemes (16) and…”

“…Generally speaking, the application should obtain a reliable transmission region to gain network access of the service provider. It has different users with distinct identities/secret key pairs to gain the exclusive rights of resource usage [16]. Figure 1 shows the electronic healthcare architecture using a CoMT.…”

Security mechanism for maritime territory and frontier surveillance in naval operations using wireless sensor networks

“…As calculated or suggested by authors in References 25,26, the computation complexity of the operations can be defined as (Elliptic Curve Cryptography(ECC) ≫ Private key cryptography > Hash). In Table 2, we calculated the computation cost for NHC, 7 CLUSS 9 protocol, and the proposed protocol.…”