Simple Photonic Emission Analysis of AES

Schlösser, A.; Nedospasov, Dmitry; Krämer, Juliane; Orlic, Susanna; Seifert, Jean-Pierre

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-33027-8_3

Cited by 78 publications

(54 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…Then, we present the photonic side channel in Chapters 3 and 4. These chapters are based on [104,105,149,150]. We explain the physics of photonic emission and the setups that we used for our photonic side channel attacks in Chapter 3.…”

Section: Structure Of the Thesismentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The following description is based on [104,105,149,150]. We explain the physical aspects of the photonic side channel in this chapter and continue with the explanation of the cryptographic aspects in Chapter 4.…”

Section: Symmetric Cryptographymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We will now present our results of photonic side channel attacks [104,105,149,150]. We attacked AES-128 and achieved full AES key recovery for SPEA as well as for DPEA.…”

Section: Definition 42 (Differential Photonic Emission Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We start with the detailed explanation of the Simple Photonic Emission Analysis in Section 4.1. This part is based on [149] and [150]. We present the results of the practical attack against AES-128 and show how the attack can be extended for AES-192 and AES-256.…”

Section: Definition 42 (Differential Photonic Emission Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

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Why cryptography should not rely on physical attack complexity

Krämer

2016

It - Information Technology

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Ich versichere an Eides statt, dass ich diese Dissertation selbständig verfasst und nur die angegebenen Quellen und Hilfsmittel verwendet habe. Datum Für meine Eltern AbstractEver since the first side channel attacks and fault attacks on cryptographic devices were introduced in the mid-nineties, new possibilities of physical attacks have been consistently explored. The risk that these attacks pose is reduced by reacting to known attacks and by developing and implementing countermeasures against them. For physical attacks whose theory is known but which have not been conducted yet, however, the situation is different. Attacks whose physical realization is assumed to be very complex are taken less seriously. The trust that these attacks will not be realized due to their physical complexity means that no countermeasures are developed at all. This leads to unprotected devices once the assessment of the complexity turns out to be wrong.This thesis presents two practical physical attacks whose theory is known for several years. Since neither attack has previously been successfully implemented in practice, however, they were not considered a serious threat. Their physical attack complexity has been overestimated and the implied security threat has been underestimated. First, we introduce the photonic side channel, which offers not only temporal resolution, but also the highest possible spatial resolution. Due to the high cost of its first realization, it has not been taken seriously. We show both simple and differential photonic side channel analyses. Then, we present a fault attack against pairing-based cryptography. Due to the need for at least two independent precise faults in a single pairing computation, it has also not been taken seriously. We show how attackers can reveal the secret key of symmetric as well as asymmetric cryptographic algorithms based on these physical attacks. We present countermeasures on the software and the hardware level, which help to prevent these attacks in the future.Based on these two presented attacks, this thesis shows that the assessment of physical attack complexity is error-prone. Hence, cryptography should not rely on it. Cryptographic technologies have to be protected against all physical attacks, have they already been realized or not. The development of countermeasures does not require the successful execution of an attack but can already be carried out as soon as the principle of a side channel or a fault attack is understood.

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Section: Structure Of the Thesismentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Symmetric Cryptographymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We will now present our results of photonic side channel attacks [104,105,149,150]. We attacked AES-128 and achieved full AES key recovery for SPEA as well as for DPEA.…”

Section: Definition 42 (Differential Photonic Emission Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Definition 42 (Differential Photonic Emission Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

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Why cryptography should not rely on physical attack complexity

Krämer

2016

It - Information Technology

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“…Improvements of the latter attack were reported by L. Zhuan et al [43] in 2009. Optical emissions, in contrast, were investigated by J. Ferrigno and M. Hlaváĉ [15] as well as A. Schlösser et al [35] who targeted an AES implementation. S. Skorobogatov [38] used a low-cost CCD camera to analyze the leakage of photons emitted from SRAM, EEPROM, and Flash memories.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Temperature Side Channel and Heating Fault Attacks

Hutter

Schmidt²

2014

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Abstract. In this paper, we present practical results of data leakages of CMOS devices via the temperature side channel-a side channel that has been widely cited in literature but not well characterized yet. We investigate the leakage of processed data by passively measuring the dissipated heat of the devices. The temperature leakage is thereby linearly correlated with the power leakage model but is limited by the physical properties of thermal conductivity and capacitance. We further present heating faults by operating the devices beyond their specified temperature ratings. The efficiency of this kind of attack is shown by a practical attack on an RSA implementation. Finally, we introduce data remanence attacks on AVR microcontrollers that exploit the Negative Bias Temperature Instability (NBTI) property of internal SRAM cells. We show how to recover parts of the internal memory and present first results on an ATmega162. The work encourages the awareness of temperature-based attacks that are known for years now but not well described in literature. It also serves as a starting point for further research investigations.

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Electromagnetic Activity vs. Logical Activity: Near Field Scans for Reverse Engineering

Lacruche

Maurine

2019

Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications

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Simple Photonic Emission Analysis of AES

Cited by 78 publications

References 19 publications

Why cryptography should not rely on physical attack complexity

Why cryptography should not rely on physical attack complexity

The Temperature Side Channel and Heating Fault Attacks

Electromagnetic Activity vs. Logical Activity: Near Field Scans for Reverse Engineering

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