Simple and efficient hash-based verifiable mixing for remote electronic voting

Verifiable Encrypted Redundancy for Mix-Type Remote Electronic Voting

“…In proposals [7,16] a malicious participant is able to send a cryptogram with a non-matching redundancy. The tracing procedure given in [7] has been shown to include some vulnerabilities [17], while in [16] the vote opening phase would have to be interrupted and the whole election be carried out again from zero.…”

“…The tracing procedure given in [7] has been shown to include some vulnerabilities [17], while in [16] the vote opening phase would have to be interrupted and the whole election be carried out again from zero. In [17] some more vulnerabilities of [7] involving dishonest mixing elements are described.…”

“…Proposals [7,16] use the "proof of product with redundancy" approach. This is a mix-type paradigm where participants add some redundancy to their votes prior to encryption.…”

“…Both limitations render this paradigm to be only appliable to elections with a small number of candidates or choices. -Mix-type remote voting (first proposed in [2]) is the most versatile and secure paradigm [8,12,15,16]. Once all encrypted votes have been collected by the polling station, they are shuffled and remasked so that the link between each ballot and the participant who cast it is lost.…”

“…After that, votes are electronically tallied and the results are published. A remote voting system must be secure in the following aspects [16]:…”