Simple and effective defense against evil twin access points

Röth, Volker; Polak, Wolfgang; Rieffel, Eleanor; Turner, Thea

doi:10.1145/1352533.1352569

Cited by 63 publications

(29 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…Therefore, users must be educated on how to remain themselves secure when they are connected to a public Wi-Fi network by using VPN Services or any service that will make user's data secured. Polak and his colleagues presented an effortless mechanism that help the users to protect themselves from Evil Twin Attack in public places [9]. This method offers small authentication string protocols for trading cryptographic keys.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mitigating Evil Twin Attacks in Wireless 802.11 Networks at Jordan

2017

IJCSI

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Thinking twice before connecting to a public Wi-Fi at a coffee shop, hotel or an airport lounge is a must nowadays. Every Wi-Fi user should be cautious whether this free Wi-Fi hotspot that is allowed to be connected to is authentic or nothing but a rogue access point. Rogue access points (aka evil twin access point) allows the attacker to eavesdrop network traffic and to intercept the victims exchanged data or to even to alter the data while en route. The objective of this study that is going to be conducted somewhere in Jordan is to assess the security level in this area and to put a remedy to the weaknesses wherever found. This paper gives a statistical survey to illustrate the threatening level of such fake access point then to analyze the weaknesses and strengths of security measures in order to raise people awareness toward this kind of attacks.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mitigating Evil Twin Attacks in Wireless 802.11 Networks at Jordan

2017

IJCSI

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“…In an independent result [14], the authors present a scheme similar to the "blinking" scheme we presented in [13]. The scheme of [14] is aimed at the detection of "evil twin" access points in cafés, airport lounges, etc.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The scheme of [14] is aimed at the detection of "evil twin" access points in cafés, airport lounges, etc. The two schemes, however, differ significantly in their implementation and therefore in terms of user experience.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The two schemes, however, differ significantly in their implementation and therefore in terms of user experience. Firstly, in the scheme of [14], the user controls the time period during which she compares each bit of the SAS data, by pressing and releasing a button on her device. The scheme of [13], on the other hand, is automatic in that this time period is a pre-determined experimental value.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The scheme of [13], on the other hand, is automatic in that this time period is a pre-determined experimental value. Secondly, in [14], the user's device needs to trigger the display of next bit on the other device by sending it a signal over the wireless channel. This requires k such signals for a k-bit long SAS and the user needs to verify whether or not these signals are delayed, dropped or injected.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Universal device pairing using an auxiliary device

Saxena¹,

Uddin²,

Voris³

2008

Proceedings of the 4th Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security

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The operation of achieving authenticated key agreement between two human-operated devices over a short-range wireless communication channel (such as Bluetooth or WiFi) is referred to as "Pairing". The devices in such a scenario are ad hoc in nature, i.e., they can neither be assumed to have a prior context (such as pre-shared secrets) with each other nor do they share a common trusted on-or off-line authority. However, the devices can generally be connected using auxiliary physical channel(s) (such as audio, visual, etc.) that can be authenticated by the device user(s) and thus form a basis for pairing.One of the main challenges of secure device pairing is the lack of good quality output interfaces as well as corresponding receivers on devices. In [13], we presented a pairing scheme which is universally applicable to any pair of devices (such as a WiFi AP and a laptop, a Bluetooth keyboard and a desktop, etc.). The scheme is based upon the device user(s) comparing short and simple synchronized audiovisual patterns, such as "beeping" and "blinking". In this paper, we automate the (manual) scheme of [13] by making use of an auxiliary, commonly available device such as a personal camera phone. Based on a preliminary user study we conducted, we show that the automated scheme is generally faster and more user-friendly relative to the manual scheme. More importantly, the proposed scheme turns out to be quite accurate in the detection of any possible attacks.

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A passive user‐side solution for evil twin access point detection at public hotspots

Hsu

Wang

et al. 2020

Int J Communication

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SummaryThis paper proposes a passive user‐side solution, called Wi‐Fi legal access point (AP) finder (LAF), to the notorious evil twin access point problem, which in turn can result in diverse security problems, such as fraud, identity theft, and man‐in‐the‐middle attacks. Due to the severe security threats created by evil twins, many promising solutions have been proposed. However, the majority of these solutions are designed for the administrators of wireless networks, not for Wi‐Fi users. Hence, they are either too expensive or need some data that are usually not accessible to normal users. LAF utilizes the TCP three‐way handshake‐related packets and packet forwarding property created by evil twins to find legal APs, called good twins, at public hotspots or unencrypted WLANs; thus, it does not need any data or assistance from wireless network administrators. LAF does not send exploring packets actively; hence, evil twins cannot sense its existence. No matter when and where a user needs to utilize an AP to connect to the Internet at a hotspot, he can just use LAF to find out a legal AP to connect to. Experimental results show that LAF can quickly and accurately find legal APs after observing only a few packets.

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Simple and effective defense against evil twin access points

Cited by 63 publications

References 16 publications

Mitigating Evil Twin Attacks in Wireless 802.11 Networks at Jordan

Mitigating Evil Twin Attacks in Wireless 802.11 Networks at Jordan

Universal device pairing using an auxiliary device

A passive user‐side solution for evil twin access point detection at public hotspots

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