Sigwart, Husserl and Frege on Truth and Logic, or Is Psychologism Still a Threat?

Picardi, Eva

doi:10.1111/1468-0378.00034

Cited by 9 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 4 publications

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“…‘What makes logic a priori is the impossibility of illogical thought’ (§ 5.4731). Interestingly, Wittgenstein's upholding of the ‘constitutivity thesis’ seems to go hand in hand with a denial of the normative character of logic: see Picardi 170–171.…”

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Frege on the Normativity and Constitutivity of Logic for Thought II

Mezzadri

2015

Philosophy Compass

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This two‐part paper reviews a scholarly debate on an alleged tension in Frege's philosophy of logic. In Section 1 of Part I, I discuss Frege's view that logic is concerned with establishing norms for correct thinking and is therefore a normative science. In Section 2, I explore a different understanding of the role of logic that Frege seems to advance: logic is constitutive of the very possibility of thought, because it sets forth necessary conditions for thought. Hence, the tension the view according to which logic is normative for thought seems to be incompatible with the idea that abiding by the laws of logic forms a precondition for thought. In Section 1 of Part II, I survey a number of interpretations of Frege's conception of logic that deal with this question. I show that they are for the most part either normative readings (emphasising the former understanding of the nature of logic) or constitutive readings (emphasising the latter). Finally, in Section 2, I adjudicate the debate and aim at reconciling the normative and the constitutive strands in Frege's conception of logic.

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Frege on the Normativity and Constitutivity of Logic for Thought II

Mezzadri

2015

Philosophy Compass

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“…See Haack 241–242. Most psychologistic conceptions of logic, however, characterised logic as a normative science; see Baker and Hacker, Frege: Logical Excavations 43, and Picardi. The normativity logic retains on such views, however, is restricted to human thought at a certain stage of its evolution; see Notturno 30–31, Kusch 35, and Baker, Hacker Frege: Logical Excavations 41, and ‘Frege's Anti‐Psychologism’ 78, 83.…”

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Frege on the Normativity and Constitutivity of Logic for Thought I

Mezzadri¹

2015

Philosophy Compass

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This two-part paper reviews a scholarly debate on an alleged tension in Frege's philosophy of logic. In Section 1 of Part I, I discuss Frege's view that logic is concerned with establishing norms for correct thinking and is therefore a normative science. In Section 2, I explore a different understanding of the role of logic that Frege seems to advance: logic is constitutive of the very possibility of thought, because it sets forth necessary conditions for thought. Hence, the tension: the view according to which logic is normative for thought seems to be incompatible with the idea that abiding by the laws of logic forms a precondition for thought. In Section 1 of Part II, I survey a number of interpretations of Frege's conception of logic that deal with this question. I show that they are for the most part either normative readings (emphasising the former understanding of the nature of logic) or constitutive readings (emphasising the latter). Finally, in Section 2, I adjudicate the debate and aim at reconciling the normative and the constitutive strands in Frege's conception of logic.

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Georg Jellinek on Values and Objectivity in the Legal and Political Sciences

Spadafora¹

2015

Mod. Intell. Hist.

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Georg Jellinek was one of the legal theorists who brought a new level of methodological sophistication to German public law scholarship at the turn of the twentieth century. Where previous research has called attention to his theory of conceptual “types” and his application of contemporary neo-Kantian epistemology to the law, this article explores his thinking on the nature of values and value judgments, and the possibilities for objectivity in the legal and political sciences. Jellinek sought to open an increasingly calcified legal positivism to the findings of the social sciences and to an inherently pluralistic, changing world of subjective values, but without abandoning the positivist ideals of legal certainty and the exclusion of political and other value judgments. Analyzing his response to this challenge opens a window onto his broader work in public law and political science, illuminating doctrines like the “two-sided” theory of the state and the “normative power of the factual,” which have achieved a lasting place in German legal and political theory. It also shows why Jellinek put aside the traditional ideal of bias-free objectivity for a surprisingly modern vision of a process of intersubjective agreement, driven by the institutions of free and open scholarly debate.

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Sigwart, Husserl and Frege on Truth and Logic, or Is Psychologism Still a Threat?

Cited by 9 publications

References 4 publications

Frege on the Normativity and Constitutivity of Logic for Thought II

Frege on the Normativity and Constitutivity of Logic for Thought II

Frege on the Normativity and Constitutivity of Logic for Thought I

Georg Jellinek on Values and Objectivity in the Legal and Political Sciences

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