Signaling theory and applicant attraction outcomes

Abstract

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is twofold. First, to discuss the application of a multi‐level perspective to signaling theory in a recruitment context. Then to discuss how the integration of signaling theory and the social identity approach may provide an improved understanding of the associations between an organization's recruitment activities and applicant attraction outcomes. The paper, first, summarizes the existing research and theoretical developments pertaining to signaling theory, multi‐level theory, and the social identity approach. From this literature a theoretical model from which research propositions are developed is suggested.Design/methodology/approachThis is a literature review, within recruitment contexts, on signaling theory, the association between market signals and applicant attraction outcomes, and the integration of signaling, social identity, and self‐categorization theories as a theoretical foundation for research propositions.FindingsDespite widespread acceptance of signaling theory in recruitment research, surprisingly little is known about the boundary conditions in the association between an organization's recruitment activities and applicant attraction outcomes.Practical implicationsA greater understanding of the application of signaling theory will enable managers to design and administer recruitment activities and processes in order to improve applicant attraction to recruiting organizations.Originality/valueThis paper fills a void in the recruitment literature by integrating signaling theory, social identity theory, and self‐categorization theory and providing avenues for future work.

Green and nongreen recruitment practices for attracting job applicants: exploring independent and interactive effects

“…Previous studies have highlighted the important role played by the content of company websites in attracting prospective job applicants and in reducing uncertainty about the vacancies posted online (e.g., Baum & Kabst, 2014;Breaugh, 2012;Williamson et al, 2010). According to signalling theory (e.g., Celani & Singh, 2011;Thompson, Braddy, & Wuensch, 2008), when a 'virtual meeting' between an employer and a prospective job applicant takes place on a website, there is significant information asymmetry between the two parties. The information available on a company website can contribute to reducing this asymmetry by providing details of the job vacancies and the employment conditions in an organization.…”

Entrepreneurship from an Islamic Perspective

“…Kirmani and Rao 2000;Spence 1973). Job seekers commonly combine signals about company ethicality from various sources to complement and consolidate their perceptions of the company and its actions (cf., Celani and Singh 2011;Srivastava and Lurie 2001). These include signals that may be controlled by the company (here: the disclosure of ethical certificates in job ads) and signals that cannot be controlled by the company (here: positive eWoM about company ethicality).…”

“…Signaling theory helps to understand how job seekers' decisions to respond to job advertisements are driven by the information they receive about potential target employers (Celani and Singh 2011;Rynes 1991;Spence 1973). Following this theory, job seekers aim at reducing information asymmetries between the organisation and themselves in order to infer the quality of the offering and inform their application decisions.…”

Virtual Career Fairs: Perspectives from Norwegian Recruiters and Exhibitors

“…The features of the virtual representation of organizations in virtual fairs (e.g., via virtual booth) may similarly operate as predictors of attractiveness, mediated by the information shared strategically as part of the recruiters' employer branding efforts. Applicant inferences about the employers and identification with the potential employer (e.g., achieved by exposure to the employer brand and image) may, therefore, play an important role in predicting attractiveness of organizations and job pursuit intention (see also [20]). …”