1982
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1982.tb01091.x
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Signaling and the Valuation of Unseasoned New Issues

Abstract: This paper is an empirical examination of the relation between firm value and two potential actions by entrepreneurs attempting to signal to investors information about otherwise unobservable firm features. The signals investigated are the proportion of equity ownership retained by entrepreneurs and the dividend policy of the firm; both signals are hypothesized to be positively related to firm value. Using a sample of unseasoned new equity issues, the empirical results are consistent with the entrepreneurial o… Show more

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Cited by 255 publications
(98 citation statements)
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“…This problem is especially magnified in situations where information asymmetry between users and suppliers of capital is high. To overcome this problem, the original vendors can signal the quality of their firm through the level of ownership retention whereby a higher level of retained ownership signals higher quality (Downes & Heinkel, 1982). It is likely that higher quality firms would pose a greater competitive threat, thus, the third specific hypothesis is (in alternative form):…”
Section: Literature Review and Hypothesis Developmentmentioning
confidence: 96%
“…This problem is especially magnified in situations where information asymmetry between users and suppliers of capital is high. To overcome this problem, the original vendors can signal the quality of their firm through the level of ownership retention whereby a higher level of retained ownership signals higher quality (Downes & Heinkel, 1982). It is likely that higher quality firms would pose a greater competitive threat, thus, the third specific hypothesis is (in alternative form):…”
Section: Literature Review and Hypothesis Developmentmentioning
confidence: 96%
“…Accordingly, an auditor type dummy variable (AUDITOR it ) equals 1 if an IPO firm is audited by a big-five firm, and 0 if audited by a non-big-five firm. 12 5. Insider stock holdings (INS it ): Prior research indicates that insider stockholdings signal insiders' expectations with respect to firm value (Leland and Pyle, 1977;Downes and Heinkel, 1982). INS it denotes insider stock holdings as a percentage of total outstanding shares at the end of the IPO year.…”
Section: Independent Variablesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…We include the change in earnings given the well-documented association of this variable with stock returns (Kothari 2001). The audit qualifications are included as an additional explanatory variable because it is the variable of interest and its 25 We also used an offer values model that was based on valuation models that have been estimated in prior empirical IPO studies such as Downes and Heinkel (1982), Ritter (1984), and Clarkson et al (1991Clarkson et al ( , 1992. These models draw from the CAPM-based IPO valuation theory of Leland and Pyle (1977).…”
Section: Relevance Of Quantifiable Audit Qualifications 525mentioning
confidence: 99%