Signaling about Norms: Socialization under Strategic Uncertainty

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

Matheson

Sonderegger

2018

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We augment standard models of cultural transmission with an explicit account of social learning, grounded in the information transmission literature. Youngsters observe the behavioral trait of a role model and form beliefs about the desirability of that trait.Adults have better information about each trait and have a paternalistic attitude toward their children. This makes them reluctant to adopt myopic behavior to avoid setting a negative example to their children. This signaling distortion increases in the influence parents have over their offspring. We extend the model to allow parental influence to depend on the population frequency of each trait and show that cultural complementarity does not imply convergence to a homogeneous population. We find empirical support for a positive relationship between parental influence and propensity to exert self-restraint by looking at alcohol and tobacco consumption.

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 60%

Teaching by example and induced beliefs in a model of cultural transmission

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

Matheson

Sonderegger

2018

Self Cite

“…However, little attention has been devoted to understanding if and how the characteristics of one's peers affect the incentives to engage in costly signaling. 2 This is what we wish to do in this paper.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 80%

A theory of esteem based peer pressure

Games and Economic Behavior

Sonderegger

2019

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Signaling models of esteem have implications for peer pressure. Using Bénabou's and Tirole's "honor-stigma" model, we analyze how the pressure to engage in costly signaling changes with the distribution of peers' attributes. In particular, we provide novel comparative statics on the effects of changes in mean, dispersion, skewness and other features of the distribution of peer quality. First, we provide conditions under which moving an individual to a group with higher mean quality may provide stronger incentives (i.e. a "keeping up with the Joneses" effect) or may induce discouragement (a "small fish in a big pond" effect). Second, we show that both right and left truncations of the distribution of peer quality reduce incentives. Third, more dispersed peer distributions provide stronger incentives. Finally, more right skewed peer distributions induce stronger incentives when only a small fraction of the group provide the signal, but reduce motivation when provision is widespread. We also analyze the aggregate effects of each of these distributional changes. Applications include education, redistribution, and conspicuous consumption.

“…Differently from those works, in our setup parental behavior informs children about the behavior they are likely to encounter in the future in the future. This shares similarities with Adriani and Sonderegger (2018), and Kotsidis (2018) [17][18][19]. However, this paper studies the mechanics and the signaling value of punishment versus reward, and is thus very different in focus.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 59%

“…If a youngster does not follow the norm, he becomes the object of social punishment. 17 We assume that the stigma associated with norm-breaking does not carry through adulthood. Hence, as adults, all individuals start off with a clean slate, independently of how they behaved as youngsters.…”

Section: Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Signaling Value of Punishing Norm-Breakers and Rewarding Norm-Followers

Sonderegger²

2018

Games

Self Cite

We formally explore the idea that punishment of norm-breakers may be a vehicle for the older generation to teach youngsters about social norms. We show that this signaling role provides sufficient incentives to sustain costly punishing behavior. People punish norm-breakers to pass information about past history to the younger generation. This creates a link between past, present, and future punishment. Information about the past is important for youngsters, because the past shapes the future. Reward-based mechanisms may also work and are welfare superior to punishment-based ones. However, reward-based mechanisms are fragile, since punishment is a more compelling signaling device (in a sense that we make precise).