Sierra Leone’s illicit diamonds: the challenges and the way forward

Abstract

Although the Kimberley Process Certificate Scheme has considerably reduced the flow of conflict diamonds from 4% to less than 1%, other forms of illicit diamonds are estimated at 20% of global production. While scholars and policy makers have given considerable attention to illicit mining and smuggling (with some success), illicit exploitation still hinders revenue generation that is needed for economic growth and development in Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries heavily reliant on alluvial minerals. Based on surveys of 240 households in four diamondiferous chiefdoms in Kono District in Sierra Leone, key informant interviews, focus groups and secondary data, and drawing from the actor-oriented approach and Le Billon (Fuelling war: natural resources and armed conflict. London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2005) conceptualization of the political geography of the resource, this paper examines the problem of illicit diamond exploitation in post-conflict Sierra Leone. It investigates: (1) the causes of illicit diamond mining and smuggling; (2) the spatial and temporal aspects of illicit mining and smuggling, and (3) possible solutions to illicit diamond exploitation. The paper argues that the ineffectiveness of national mining laws/ policies has created conditions that are exploited by local and international actors in the diamond industry. This is further exacerbated by the political geography of the resource. Study findings reveal that while better mining regulation could reduce illicit exploitation, bringing buyers closers to miners and offering them better prices for rough diamonds will minimize smuggling and thus increase government's mineral revenue base.

Agriculture and Artisanal Gold Mining in Sierra Leone: Alternatives or Complements?

“…Artisanal miners are far more mobile, the vast majority being unlicensed and thus not bound 11 In-depth interviews with informal artisanal miners in and around the Makong area in May 2009. to a specific site, and they will often move between sites over the year until a promising one is found. In this sense, the reasons for the unlicensed nature of artisanal (gold) mining in Sierra Leone are more than just high license costs and bureaucratic hassles (see Levin, 2005;Wilson, 2009).…”

Building a peace economy?

“…Other targeted policies, albeit less controversial, have likewise been questioned in terms of their effectiveness on transformation. Although occasionally heralded as a success in terms contributing to overall reductions in conflict diamonds and as prime example of cooperation between states, NGOs, MNCs and consumers, the Kimberley Process has faced much criticism (Cooper, 2011;Crossin, Hayman and Taylor, 2003;Hilson and Clifford, 2010;Maconachie, 2009;Smillie, 2005;Winer, 2005;Turner, 2006;van Dijck, 2009;Wilson, 2011;Zulu and Wilson, 2009). For example, it has been condemned for lacking substantive capacity for monitoring and enforcement.…”

Whose Minerals, Whose Development? Rhetoric and Reality in Post‐Conflict Sierra Leone

“…Dealers and exporters have licensed agents who assist them, while also drawing on informal ‘coaxers’ to attract sellers. Freelance, urban‐based diamond peddlars, or open‐yai , target ‘loose’ or illegal diamonds and sell to licensed dealers or smuggle via social networks across the porous borders mostly into Liberia and Guinea (van der Laan, 1965; Levin and Gberie, 2006; Reno, 1995; Wilson, 2011). Thus, dealers often have extensive networks of agents, coaxers, miners, diggers and open‐yai from which they ‘net’ diamonds.…”