Sider on the epistemology of structure

Warren, Jared

doi:10.1007/s11098-015-0621-z

Cited by 13 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…Warren’s (2016) presentation of the challenge is a good way of introducing the problem. Let premise (1) be that a certain ontologist, call him Nemo, entertains all correct attitudes about what there is in an ontologically relevant sense.…”

Section: The Reliability Challenge To the Naturalistic Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It faces a significant hurdle, which may be called the problem of lucky reliability . A formulation of this problem is offered by Jared Warren (2016; 2017). In his arguments, Warren targets a general form of realism , which he defines as endorsing the following claims: first, that a certain domain of inquiry is one whose discourse is truth apt, where there are some truths to be discovered; second, these truths are mind independent; third, truth is not pluralistic, in the sense that, in each relevant domain, there are not many truths, only one truth; and fourth, the unique truths in each relevant domain are causally inaccessible (2017, 9–10).…”

Section: The Reliability Challenge To the Naturalistic Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It faces a significant hurdle, which may be called the problem of lucky reliability. A formulation of this problem is offered by Jared Warren (2016;. 1 In his arguments, Warren targets a general 1 Warren's argument is inspired by Paul Benacerraf's challenge for mathematical Platonism, as well as by Harty Field's reformulation of the challenge.…”

Section: T H E R E L I a Bi L I T Y C H A L L E Nge To T H E Nat U R ...mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Ontological disagreements, reliability, and standoffs: The pluralist option

Belleri

2021

Metaphilosophy

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The reliability challenge to ontology can be summarized as the complaint that no satisfying explanation is available of how one can have true ontological beliefs, given that the relevant belief‐forming methods are noncausal (for example, not perception based or memory based). This paper first presents a version of the reliability challenge against realist approaches to ontology, put forward by Jared Warren. It then explores a response to the challenge on behalf of the realist that appeals to the use of abduction. This response does not satisfactorily deal with the reliability challenge, though, and even leads to a further epistemic impasse. At this point, a version of ontological pluralism is presented, according to which all the competing theories in a certain ontological dispute can be true—in a sense of “true” to be articulated. The final step shows how this version of pluralism deals with the reliability challenge, especially with the complaint that we lack an explanation for our true ontological beliefs.

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Section: The Reliability Challenge To the Naturalistic Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Reliability Challenge To the Naturalistic Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: T H E R E L I a Bi L I T Y C H A L L E Nge To T H E Nat U R ...mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Ontological disagreements, reliability, and standoffs: The pluralist option

Belleri

2021

Metaphilosophy

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“…We are justified in believing that a term is elite if and only if that term (or a synonym) appears in at least one of the most virtuous total theories. (Warren 2016(Warren , pp. 2424(Warren -2425 These approaches have different consequences.…”

Section: Redundancy and Arbitrariness As Theoretical Vicesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Logical Realism and the Riddle of Redundancy

Pérez

2022

Mind

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According to an influential view, when it comes to representing reality, some words are better suited for the job than others. This is elitism. There is reason to believe that the set of the best, or elite, words should not be redundant or arbitrary. However, we are often forced to choose between these two theoretical vices, especially in cases involving theories that seem to be mere notational variants. This is the riddle of redundancy: both redundancy and arbitrariness are vicious, but there are cases in which one must be picked. Logical realists admit that there are some logical constants among the elite words. This leads to awkward questions, such as which among conjunction and disjunction is elite. In this paper, I show how the riddle of redundancy arises for logical realists, and offer a solution. This approach requires us to change how we represent negation. Instead of using some particular symbol, we represent negation by flipping formulae over the horizontal axis.

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“…Jared Warren argues that a proponent of the notion of structure faces the same challenge as Platonists about abstract objects or realists about valuenamely, that there needs to be given an explanation as to how we can have reliable beliefs about structure. SeeWarren (2016), who develops this challenge in more detail. Due to reasons of space, I cannot address these concerns here.28 Sider (2013) is a nihilist about composite objects and he consequently denies that "parthood" is a perfectly structural term.His argument against the existence of composite objects relies on the idea that nihilism is an ideologically simpler theory.29Donaldson (2015) is a critical discussion of Sider's view that the existential quantifier is perfectly structural.…”

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confidence: 99%

Grounding, metaphysical laws, and structure

Grajner

2021

Philosophical Books

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According to the deductive-nomological account of ground, a fact A grounds another fact B in case the laws of metaphysics determine the existence of B on the basis of the existence of A. Accounts of grounding of this particular variety have already been developed in the literature. My aim in this paper is to sketch a new version of this account. My preferred account offers two main improvements over existing accounts. First, the present account is able to deal with necessitarian as well as non-necessitarian cases of grounding by acknowledging How to cite this article:

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Sider on the epistemology of structure

Cited by 13 publications

References 24 publications

Ontological disagreements, reliability, and standoffs: The pluralist option

Ontological disagreements, reliability, and standoffs: The pluralist option

Logical Realism and the Riddle of Redundancy

Grounding, metaphysical laws, and structure

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