Sickness Absence, Sick Leave Pay, and Pay Schemes

Dale‐Olsen, Harald

doi:10.1111/labr.12022

Cited by 32 publications

(23 citation statements)

References 55 publications

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“…Immediately after all employees gained access to paid and unpaid sick leave, the infection rates decrease significantly by up to 20 percent. Note that the estimates past 480 days following the law lack precision because they are solely based on the experiences in San Francisco 2007 Hence, the fact that one seems to observe a long-term rebound of infection rates to the zero line is determined by a lack of precision and the early experiences in San Francisco 2007, DC (2008 and2014), and Seattle (2012). More importantly, the rebound may be driven by the confounding effect of the Great Recession for San Francisco (it is well documented that fear of unemployment increases presenteeism).…”

Section: Changes In Influenza Activity When Employees Gain Sick Pay Cmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Several empirical papers evaluate the causal effects of cuts in sick pay and find that employees adjust their labor supply in response to such cuts Palme 1996, 2005;De Paola et al 2014;Ziebarth andKarlsson 2010, 2014;Dale-Olsen 2014;Fevang et al 2014). 1 Traditionally, behavioral adjustments to varying levels of insurance generosity is labeled 'moral hazard' in economics (Pauly 1974(Pauly , 1983Arnott and Stiglitz 1991;Nyman 1999;Newhouse 2006;Felder 2008;Bhattacharya and Packalen 2012).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The pros and cons of sick pay schemes: Testing for contagious presenteeism and noncontagious absenteeism behavior

Pichler

Ziebarth

2017

Journal of Public Economics

105

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Section: Changes In Influenza Activity When Employees Gain Sick Pay Cmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The pros and cons of sick pay schemes: Testing for contagious presenteeism and noncontagious absenteeism behavior

Pichler

Ziebarth

2017

Journal of Public Economics

105

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Pros and Cons of Sick Pay Schemes: Testing for Contagious Presenteeism and Noncontagious Absenteeism Behavior

Pichler

Ziebarth

2016

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This paper provides an analytical framework and uses data from the US and Germany to test for the existence of contagious presenteeism and negative externalities in sickness insurance schemes. The first part exploits high-frequency Google Flu data and the staggered implementation of U.S. sick leave reforms to show in a reduced-from framework that population-level influenza-like disease rates decrease after employees gain access to paid sick leave. Next, a simple theoretical framework provides evidence on the underlying behavioral mechanisms. The model theoretically decomposes overall behavioral labor supply adjustments ('moral hazard') into contagious presenteeism and noncontagious absenteeism behavior and derives testable conditions. The last part illustrates how to implement the model exploiting German sick pay reforms and administrative industry-level data on certified sick leave by diagnoses. It finds that the labor supply elasticity for contagious diseases is significantly smaller than for noncontagious diseases. Under the identifying assumptions of the model, in addition to the evidence from the U.S., this finding provides indirect evidence for the existence of contagious presenteeism. Stefan Pichler AbstractThis paper provides an analytical framework and uses data from the US and Germany to test for the existence of contagious presenteeism and negative externalities in sickness insurance schemes. The first part exploits high-frequency Google Flu data and the staggered implementation of U.S. sick leave reforms to show in a reduced-from framework that population-level influenza-like disease rates decrease after employees gain access to paid sick leave. Next, a simple theoretical framework provides evidence on the underlying behavioral mechanisms. The model theoretically decomposes overall behavioral labor supply adjustments ('moral hazard') into contagious presenteeism and noncontagious absenteeism behavior and derives testable conditions. The last part illustrates how to implement the model exploiting German sick pay reforms and administrative industry-level data on certified sick leave by diagnoses. It finds that the labor supply elasticity for contagious diseases is significantly smaller than for noncontagious diseases. Under the identifying assumptions of the model, in addition to the evidence from the U.S., this finding provides indirect evidence for the existence of contagious presenteeism.

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“…Dale-Olsen (2014) benytter også det samme datamaterialet for å undersøke om variasjon i sykepengenes kompensasjonsgrad blant arbeidstakere med inntekt rundt 6G påvirker sykefravaeret deres. Siden Nav kun refunderer arbeidsgiveres utgifter til sykepenger for inntekt inntil 6G, og en del arbeidstakere i privat sektor har arbeidsgivere som ikke topper sykelønn for ansatte med inntekt som overstiger dette nivået (Blekensaune og DaleOlsen, 2010), kan sammenligning av sykefravaer for ansatte med inntekt like under eller like over dette nivået belyse om kompensasjonsgraden påvirker sykefravaeret til ansatte i dette lønnssjiktet.…”

Section: Arbeidstakers øKonomiske Insentiverunclassified

De helserelaterte trygdeytelsene - Betydningen av økonomiske insentiver og samspill mellom trygdeordninger

Grasdal¹

2016

TFV

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Empiriske studier fra Norge og andre land viser at både arbeidstakere og arbeidsgivere lar seg påvirke av økonomiske insentiver i offentlige trygdeordninger. Generøse ytelser og lav medfinansiering gir begge parter svake insentiver til å unngå sykefravaer, og medvirker til at helserelaterte trygdeordninger brukes som substitutt for arbeidsløshetstrygd. Forskningsresultater fra land som har innført reformer for å redusere sykefravaer og dempe tilstrømmingen til uføretrygd viser at økonomiske innstramminger og strengere kontroll virker, men at dette også fører marginale arbeidstakere med mangelfull kompetanse og mindre helseplager over på andre, midlertidige trygdeordninger og ut av arbeidsstyrken.Nøkkelord økonomiske insentiv, sykeforsikring, uføretrygd, arbeidsløshetstrygd, gradert trygd Health-Related Social Security Benefits Meaning of financial incentives and interaction between social security schemes.There is growing empirical evidence from Norway and other countries that both employers and employees respond to economic incentives in the social security system. Generous contributions and low co-payment in public sickness-and disability insurances weaken incentives for both parties to avoid sick leave, and sickness benefits tend to become a substitute for unemployment benefits. In some countries, where reforms have been introduced in order to reduce sick leave and curb inflow rates to disability benefits, empirical research shows that lower compensation rates, stricter gate-keeping and privatization of insurances, contribute to reduced work absence; but at the cost of vulnerable groups with below average productivity experiencing a higher risk of being pushed out of the labor market.

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Sickness Absence, Sick Leave Pay, and Pay Schemes

Cited by 32 publications

References 55 publications

The pros and cons of sick pay schemes: Testing for contagious presenteeism and noncontagious absenteeism behavior

The pros and cons of sick pay schemes: Testing for contagious presenteeism and noncontagious absenteeism behavior

The Pros and Cons of Sick Pay Schemes: Testing for Contagious Presenteeism and Noncontagious Absenteeism Behavior

De helserelaterte trygdeytelsene - Betydningen av økonomiske insentiver og samspill mellom trygdeordninger

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