‘Should I Stay or Should I Go ?’—A Critical Analysis of the Right to Withdraw from the EU

Hofmeister, Hannes

doi:10.1111/j.1468-0386.2010.00524.x

Cited by 26 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 2 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Prior to the Convention, the legality of unilateral exit from the EU had been contentious (Athanassiou, 2009; Berglund, 2006; Harbo, 2008; Herbst, 2006; Hofmeister, 2010; Weiler, 1985; Wyrozumska, 2012). Most of the cited authors do not take a strong position themselves.…”

Section: The Eu’s Adoption Of An Exit Right At the European Conventionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Enlargement and exit: The origins of Article 50

Huysmans

2019

European Union Politics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Many international organizations and the vast majority of federations lack exit clauses. Existing theoretical explanations of this stylized fact focus on issues of credible commitment, signaling, and the risk of strategic exploitation. However, such accounts are unable to explain the adoption of Article 50 by the European Union, which allows unilateral withdrawal. I theorize and demonstrate empirically that in the case of the European Union, an exit-voice logic lies at its origin during the 2002-2003 European Convention. As a protection to undesired policy changes post entry, countries of the 2004 Eastern accession demanded an exit right. Underlying the fear for policy changes was their much lower level of economic development and corresponding differences in policy preferences. As a mirror image, rich outliers like the United Kingdom and Denmark also supported Article 50, which likely contributed to its final adoption through the Treaty of Lisbon.

show abstract

Section: The Eu’s Adoption Of An Exit Right At the European Conventionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Enlargement and exit: The origins of Article 50

Huysmans

2019

European Union Politics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…From the point of view of international law, withdrawal was conceivable despite the absence of provisions in the EU Treaties. The Treaty of Lisbon (2009) was the first to contain a withdrawal clause (Hofmeister, 2010). Each Member State may decide to withdraw voluntarily from the EU.…”

Section: Brexit's First Consequencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Eu-Brexit-Cee-Ukraine: Europe’s Healthier Future and Socio-Economic Leadership

Freyer

2020

JEE

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The horrors of WWII changed history and created a better Europe based on a Common market as an essential signal of unity among the EU member states. Now generations have grown up in peace and growing prosperity. However, a decade ago, ECB/EU had to overcome the EU-euro-financial crisis and now Brexit. In addition, Covid19 crisis brings many pressing problems, as the Coronavirus pandemic is likely to result in Europe/Germany’s largest economic downturn in the last seven decades. Loss of prosperity, des-integration in the European Union could escalate further. Even in academic and scientific institutions and in European research networks difficulties are relevant. Can we overcome Brexit / Corona and create a healthy Europe that is a global socioeconomic leader? Based on our Cultural Heritage across Europe we must look further than Brexit, and even more seek solutions to the Ukrainian conflict.

show abstract

“…It is hence an unconditional unilateral right to withdraw, only limited by the 2-year-waiting period. The rationale of the clause is that the member states remain the ‘masters of the treaties’ (Hofmeister 2010, 592). It underlines the equality and sovereignty of states and the right to national self-determination.…”

Section: The Right To Withdraw and European Citizenshipmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why withdrawal from the European Union is undemocratic

Olsen

Rostbøll

2017

Int. Theory

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The The British decision to leave the EU in the referendum held on the 23rd of June 2016 was made possible by article 50 in the Lisbon Treaty which allows member states to the leave the EU on their own decision. Before the Lisbon Treaty EU membership was in principle for eternity. The Brexit decision has been criticised for being based on a democratic process of poor quality due to manipulation of facts and unrealistic promises for the future. But few have questioned the democratic legitimacy of the British people unilaterally deciding on whether or not to remain in the EU. In this article, as part of a general argument, we will do exactly that. We argue that withdrawal from the EU by any member state cannot be defended from the perspective of fundamental democratic principles.Withdrawal violates basic democratic commitments and undermines the possible democraticness of relationships that should be democratic. The main reason for this assessment is that EU citizens across 2 borders mutually affect each other's fundamental interests and that the EU affords citizens with a status of individual rights holders and co-rulers that would be seriously affected by unilateral withdrawal by one state. The problem is twofold. First, all those whose status is affected by the decision to withdraw are not included in making it. Second, by withdrawing from the EU, citizens will be less able to rule together democratically with regard to the issues that affect them and their status across borders. While some degree of national self-determination is called for by democratic principles, national selfdetermination cannot be absolute; that is, it cannot trump the democratic right (of other citizens) to participate in decisions that significantly affect them as individuals and as citizens; a right which is (otherwise) institutionalized by the EU. We therefore conclude that unilateral and even mutually agreed withdrawal from the EU cannot be defended on the basis of democratic principles as easily as some believe.We build our case against withdrawal from the EU on a development of the all affected principle, which says that all those affected by a decision should be included in making it. In the literature, there has been a discussion about what is the relevant understanding of being affected; what the currency of affectedness is. A central notion is that it is the affectedness of individual interests, either actually or potentially, that explains why and when people should be included in decisions. This results in the all affected interests principle. Another idea is that it is not the fact that one's interests are affected that is decisive for whether one should be included in decisions or not but that one is subjected to potential coercion. This results in the all-subjected principle. Building on the criticism of these two principles and taking inspiration from the literature on non-domination, we develop our own conception of the currency of affectedness and formulate the all affected status principle, which states that pe...

show abstract

‘Should I Stay or Should I Go ?’—A Critical Analysis of the Right to Withdraw from the EU

Cited by 26 publications

References 2 publications

Enlargement and exit: The origins of Article 50

Enlargement and exit: The origins of Article 50

Eu-Brexit-Cee-Ukraine: Europe’s Healthier Future and Socio-Economic Leadership

Why withdrawal from the European Union is undemocratic

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About