Should I go by bus? The liberalization of the long-distance bus industry in France

Blayac, Thierry; Bougette, Patrice

doi:10.1016/j.tranpol.2017.03.004

Cited by 29 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…In the subsequent second section, we initially characterize the process and outcome of the deregulation process in the German interurban bus industry and provide a brief initial overview on firm entry, firm exit and industry growth after deregulation. The third section is then devoted to a detailed 1 For a characterization of first experiences with the deregulated French interurban bus industry, please see the valuable contribution by Blayac and Bougette (2017).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Patterns of entry and exit in the deregulated German interurban bus industry

Dürr

Hüschelrath

2017

Transport Policy

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp17041.pdf Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar. Terms of use: Documents inDis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW research prompt ly avai la ble to other eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW. PATTERNS OF ENTRY AND EXIT IN THE DEREGULATED GERMAN INTERURBAN BUS INDUSTRYNiklas S. Dürr ♣ and Kai Hüschelrath * June 2017 AbstractWe study patterns of entry and exit in the German interurban bus industry in the first three years after its deregulation in January 2013. Using a comprehensive data set of all firm and route entries and exits, we find that the industry grew much quicker than originally expectedwith particularly a few new entrants being most successful in quickly extending their route networks from regional to national coverage. Although the clear majority of routes is operated on a monopoly basis, competition does play a key role on routes with a sufficiently large base of (potential) customers. From a spatial perspective, three years after deregulation, the entire interurban bus network connects 60 percent of all 644 larger German cities -with the intensity of entry being dependent on the number of inhabitants, average income, the share of under 24 years old and the presence of intermodal competition by intercity railway services.JEL Class L11, L41, L43, L92, K21, K23

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Patterns of entry and exit in the deregulated German interurban bus industry

Dürr

Hüschelrath

2017

Transport Policy

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“…Previous studies dedicated to the interaction between the bus and rail modes on long-distance paths, following the deregulation processes, were mainly dedicated to price decisions analysis of active market participants [12], [13], the evolution of the intramodal long-haul bus market (e.g. network dimension and density on the territory, market concentration, market composition [3], [10], [14]) and evaluation of the users' willingness to pay for different characteristics of the offered transport services (i.e. surveys, applications of discrete choice modelling [15]).…”

Section: Related Work In Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…small vehicles) and the production costs structure (e.g. not owned fleet), allow for high flexibility [10]. PBSRs are also able to apply lower prices, compared to rail operators.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Effects of Bus-Based Disruptive Business Models With Limited Capacity on Rail Monopolies: Social Welfare Implications

Avenali

Gregori

Reverberi

2020

WIT Transactions on the Built Environment

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Long distance passenger transport markets are facing important changes as new entrants, e-Platform based bus services retailer (PBSR) operators, are challenging the railway incumbents applying judo economic strategies. Traditionally, European policymakers tended to favour railway services over road services in the long-haul markets, often leading the rail operators in monopolistic-alike positions. Recently, several countries deregulated their national intercity bus markets, gradually introducing intermodal competition in the sector. The competition led to important improvements in service quality, but it also had negative impacts on rail operators' profitability, especially after PBSR operators started to work, due to their disruptive business model based on aggregative online platforms and production externalization. PBSR companies (e.g. Flixbus, BlaBlaBus) are characterized by high flexibility and low production costs, which use as advantage against the incumbents. The rail operators are instead characterized by high indivisibility, high production costs and, usually, big sizes. Losses in either revenues or market shares could easily force them into reducing services quantity or even exit the market. Our paper aims to analyse these new competitive relations in the intercity intermodal market, focusing on resulting impacts on market shares, demand satisfaction and social welfare. Since the bus operators present limited capacity due to technical feasibility (e.g. minimum headway) and the need to limit road congestion (to preserve service quality), the mobility right fulfilment is put in jeopardy. We modelled the competitive relations through game theory, excluding high speed rail from the perimeter to preserve service comparability. Profit levels and optimal social welfare are then studied through simulations. Results confirm that for increasing PBSR production capacity, railway operators tend to have fewer profits or be forced to leave the market, resulting in unsatisfied demand. Furthermore, from a social point of view, the rail monopoly seems to be, under specific circumstances, preferred to a duopoly.

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“…In some countries, such as the United States (Klein, 2009), Great Britain (White & Robbins, 2012), Germany (Augustin et al, 2014) and France (Blayac & Bougette, 2017), operators are not obliged to use terminals as a place for passengers to transit, as passengers can transit from the curbsidethis service is called 'bus curbside'. This policy results in the deregulation of transportation policies that provide some flexibility for operators to compete in terms of providing services to passengers.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Determination of Transit Service Accessibility Standard for Intercity Bus Passengers

Abdullah

Yudono

Adisasmita

et al. 2019

IRSPSD International

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Intercity bus terminals function as transit facilities that tend to be less effective. Intercity bus passengers prefer to transit outside the terminal. The connectivity factor is consideration of the passengers' needs (Abdullah et al., 2018), one of its indicators is accessibility to or from the transit location. At present, there is no standard for a convenient transit location distance for passengers from the place of origin or to a destination in the city. The criteria are compiled into the passenger transit level of service (LOS), as an effective tool to evaluate the quality of the location based on passengers' perceptions with the scales LOS A (Very Near), LOS B (Near), LOS C (Rather Close), LOS D (A Little Far), LOS E (Far) and, LOS F (Very Far). The research and case study were conducted in Makassar city. The data were obtained through questionnaires. Law Successive interval scaling and regression were used as the methods of analysis. The results of the research indicate that the transit distances expected by passengers were as follows: LOS A-B is<2 km and LOS C is 2,1-4 km , LOS D is 4,1-12 km, LOS E is 12,1-20 km and, LOS F is >20 km. Moreover, the distances of the transit location from roads were as follows: LOS A-B is < 100m, LOS C is 100-1000m, LOS D is 1001-2000 m, LOS E is 2001-2400m and LOS F is >2400 m.

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Should I go by bus? The liberalization of the long-distance bus industry in France

Abstract: International audienc

Cited by 29 publications

References 15 publications

Patterns of entry and exit in the deregulated German interurban bus industry

Patterns of entry and exit in the deregulated German interurban bus industry

Effects of Bus-Based Disruptive Business Models With Limited Capacity on Rail Monopolies: Social Welfare Implications

Determination of Transit Service Accessibility Standard for Intercity Bus Passengers

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