Should have known

Goldberg, Sanford C.

doi:10.1007/s11229-015-0662-z

Cited by 74 publications

(49 citation statements)

References 41 publications

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“…Despite this, the case in favour of epistemic blameworthiness is not yet complete. For, a range of authors have recently argued that there is a moral or social sense in which one ought generally to conform one's doxastic states to the evidence (Goldberg 2015(Goldberg , 2017(Goldberg , 2018Graham 2015;Vanderheiden 2016). Indeed, Goldberg argues that the norm of conforming one's beliefs to the evidence is ultimately grounded in, or derived from, moral or social norms and is thus best regarded as moral or social.…”

Section: Blameworthy and Blameless Beliefmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For social norms can be morally abhorrent such as norms favouring female circumcision. Goldberg agrees that it is only legitimate social expectations which are of interest and which potentially ground true claims that someone should have done something even if they failed to do it (Goldberg 2017(Goldberg : 2867. Goldberg attempts to show that the relevant epistemic expectations are legitimate by appeal to our practices of informational exchange and acting together with others.…”

Section: A Social Duty To Meet Epistemic Expectationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…that we are entitled to expect people to be epistemically responsible … you have once again called into question something that is part and parcel of our everyday practice of relying on others say so: why should a hearer, H, take a speaker, S's, word for something if H cannot expect that S has avoided the vices of closed mindedness, dogmatism, incuriosity, and so forth?'' (Goldberg 2017(Goldberg : 2894. 5 Goldberg's argument hinges on the idea that if we call into question the claim that we are entitled to suppose that others will meet certain epistemic expectations, say, know the salient features of their immediate environment, this would undermine the practical rationality of the practice of testimony.…”

Section: A Social Duty To Meet Epistemic Expectationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Epistemically blameworthy belief

Brown

2019

Philos Stud

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When subjects violate epistemic standards or norms, we sometimes judge them blameworthy rather than blameless. For instance, we might judge a subject blameworthy for dogmatically continuing to believe a claim even after receiving evidence which undermines it. Indeed, the idea that one may be blameworthy for belief is appealed to throughout the contemporary epistemic literature. In some cases, a subject seems blameworthy for believing as she does even though it seems prima facie implausible that she is morally blameworthy or professionally blameworthy. Such cases raise the question of whether one can be blameworthy for a belief in a specifically epistemic sense rather than in some already recognised sense, such as being morally or professionally blameworthy. A number of authors have recently argued that there is a moral or social sense in which one ought to conform one's beliefs to the evidence (e.g. Goldberg, Graham, Vanderheiden). In this paper, I argue that even while accepting that there are moral and social norms governing belief, there are cases in which a subject is blameworthy for a belief but isn't plausibly morally or socially blameworthy. If this latter view is correct, then we may need to develop a new account of blame which can be applied to beliefs which are not morally or socially blameworthy.

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Section: Blameworthy and Blameless Beliefmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: A Social Duty To Meet Epistemic Expectationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: A Social Duty To Meet Epistemic Expectationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Epistemically blameworthy belief

Brown

2019

Philos Stud

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“…See here also Bergmann (1997;. 6 For a helpful recent discussion of the epistemic 'should' in cases where we claim an agent should (epistemically) have believed something or known something, see Goldberg (2015). Cf.…”

Section: Propositional Knowledge and Epistemic Defeatmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Defeasibility of Knowledge‐How

Carter

Navarro

2017

Philos Phenomenol Research

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) hold that knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that. If this thesis is correct, then we should expect the defeasibility conditions for knowledge-how and knowledge-that to be uniform-viz., that the mechanisms of epistemic defeat which undermine propositional knowledge will be equally capable of imperilling knowledge-how. The goal of this paper is twofold: first, against intellectualism, we will show that knowledge-how is in fact resilient to being undermined by the very kinds of traditional (propositional) epistemic defeaters which clearly defeat the items of propositional knowledge which intellectualists identify with knowledge-how. Second, we aim to fill an important lacuna in the contemporary debate, which is to develop an alternative way in which epistemic defeat for knowledge-how could be modelled within an anti-intellectualist framework.

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“…H. Smith 1983. For a recent discussion of should-have-knowns that do not ground culpability, see Goldberg 2015. GUNNAR.BJORNSSON@UMU.SE DRAFT OF FEBRUARY 12, 2016 traced back to a prior conscious decision to take a certain risk for which the agent is directly responsible. 4 That view, however, might seem to suggest that we are very rarely responsible in cases like Victor's, as it seems that we very rarely decide such things.…”

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confidence: 99%

Explaining (Away) the Epistemic Condition on Moral Responsibility

Björnsson¹

2017

Oxford Scholarship Online

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It is clear that lack of awareness of the consequences of an action can undermine moral responsibility and blame for these consequences. But when and how it does so is controversial. Sometimes an agent believing that the outcome might occur is excused because it seemed unlikely to her, and sometimes an agent having no idea that it would occur is nevertheless to blame. A low or zero degree of belief might seem to excuse unless the agent "should have known better", but it is unclear how to spell out this normative condition.This chapter combines (a) an independently motivated account of responsibility, blame, and credit as grounded in a normal explanatory relation between agential qualities and objects of responsibility with (b) the familiar Strawsonian idea that moral blame and credit depend on the agent's quality of will. The resulting explanatory quality of will condition on moral responsibility is then further motivated by being shown to account for the effects on moral blame and credit of justifications, as well as of excuses and undermined control in cases not involving ignorance.The explanatory quality of will condition is finally applied to cases involving various degrees of lack of awareness. Though this condition itself involves no awareness requirement, it is shown how it accounts for the degrees to which lack of awareness can excuse. It is also explained how lack of awareness fails as an excuse exactly when the agent should have known better and can be blamed for not doing so.

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Should have known

Cited by 74 publications

References 41 publications

Epistemically blameworthy belief

Epistemically blameworthy belief

The Defeasibility of Knowledge‐How

Explaining (Away) the Epistemic Condition on Moral Responsibility

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