Should biomedical research with great apes be restricted? A systematic review of reasons

Abstract

Background The use of great apes (GA) in invasive biomedical research is one of the most debated topics in animal ethics. GA are, thus far, the only animal group that has frequently been banned from invasive research; yet some believe that these bans could inaugurate a broader trend towards greater restrictions on the use of primates and other animals in research. Despite ongoing academic and policy debate on this issue, there is no comprehensive overview of the reasons advanced for or against restricting invasive research with GA. To address this gap, we conducted a systematic review of the reasons reported in the academic literature on this topic. Methods Seven databases were searched for articles published in English. Two authors screened the titles, abstracts, and full texts of all articles. Two journals specialized in animal ethics, and the reference lists of included articles were subsequently also reviewed. Results We included 60 articles, most of which were published between 2006 and 2016. Twenty-five articles argued for a total ban of GA research, 21 articles defended partial restrictions, and 14 articles argued against restrictions. Overall, we identified 110 reason types, 74 for, and 36 against, restricting GA research. Reasons were grouped into nine domains: moral standing, science, welfare, public and expert attitudes, retirement and conservation, respect and rights, financial costs, law and legal status, and longer-term consequences. Conclusion Our review generated five main findings. First, there is a trend in the academic debate in favor of restricting GA research that parallels worldwide policy changes in the same direction. Second, in several domains (e.g., moral standing, and respect and rights), the reasons were rather one-sided in favor of restrictions. Third, some prominent domains (e.g., science and welfare) featured considerable engagement between opposing positions. Fourth, there is low diversity and independence among authors, including frequent potential conflicts of interests in articles defending a strong position (i.e., favoring a total ban or arguing against restrictions). Fifth, scholarly discussion was not the norm, as reflected in a high proportion of non-peer-reviewed articles and authors affiliated to non-academic institutions.

What Do Chimeras Think About?

“…Some "…believe that these bans could inaugurate a broader trend towards greater restrictions on the use of primates and other animals in research." 66 Law may preclude such immediate risks, such as banning "Human biomedical research involving the introduction of human stem cells (including induced pluripotent stem cells) or human neural cells into the brain of living great apes whether prenatal or postnatal." 67 Chimpanzees are our closest relatives, and share similar (i.e., not identical) morphology, comparative evolutionary complexity of brain structures (with behavioral, [pro]social, and cultural similarities), and experimental neuronal plasticity.…”

Xenotransplantation: A historical–ethical account of viewpoints

“…Many in society would likely have grave concerns about the killing of primates in large numbers to act as organ donors for humans, and there remains continued unease about their use in many scientific endeavors. 28 Nevertheless, there remain concerns about the use of pigs as a source of organs, given their high intelligence, complex mental lives, and capacity for suffering. For instance, Peter Singer has long advocated against speciesism, 29 which he has defined as the "prejudice or attitude of bias in favor of the interests of members of one's own species and against those of members of other species."…”

Response to the ISSCR guidelines on human–animal chimera research

“…Despite lacking language, chimpanzees and other Great Apes are sometimes argued to have full moral status by dint of their rationality, autonomy, and other complex capacities, 38 and many jurisdictions prohibit harmful experimentation with these animals for this reason. 39 Other philosophers argue that self-consciousness is insignificant to moral status, 40 and instead ground moral status in the nature and strength of a being's interests. 41 It is not obvious why chimeric animals should be required to achieve human forms of self-consciousness before being granted serious moral consideration.…”