2020
DOI: 10.1016/j.energy.2020.117926
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Short-term scheduling of electricity retailers in the presence of Demand Response Aggregators: A two-stage stochastic Bi-Level programming approach

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Cited by 47 publications
(20 citation statements)
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“…Furthermore, Rayati et al [33] have formalised a non-cooperative game-theoretic framework to adequately model the strategic interactions of DRAs, who constitute a balancing group within the context of European electricity markets, where the balancing group representative is responsible for the net imbalances of the associated portfolio of generation and/or demand. Moreover, Dadashi et al [34] have formulated a bi-level, stochastic game-theoretic model to solve the short-term decision-making problem on the optimal volumes of energy imports for each hour of the next day in the presence of a single DRA. Based on the numerical simulation results, they have demonstrated the effectiveness of their framework in yielding an equilibrium DR dispatch solution, where the profits of the utility and the DRA are increased by ~6% and ~70%, respectively, compared to a business-as-usual approach.…”
Section: Game-theoretic Models Applied To Demand-side Management Studiesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Furthermore, Rayati et al [33] have formalised a non-cooperative game-theoretic framework to adequately model the strategic interactions of DRAs, who constitute a balancing group within the context of European electricity markets, where the balancing group representative is responsible for the net imbalances of the associated portfolio of generation and/or demand. Moreover, Dadashi et al [34] have formulated a bi-level, stochastic game-theoretic model to solve the short-term decision-making problem on the optimal volumes of energy imports for each hour of the next day in the presence of a single DRA. Based on the numerical simulation results, they have demonstrated the effectiveness of their framework in yielding an equilibrium DR dispatch solution, where the profits of the utility and the DRA are increased by ~6% and ~70%, respectively, compared to a business-as-usual approach.…”
Section: Game-theoretic Models Applied To Demand-side Management Studiesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The network needs to be upgraded with new investments that can reduce uncertainties and foster small producers' participation, increasing competition level ([23]). Literature on regulation is also focused on how to design tariffs ( [24]) and how to regulate old and new agents: this is particularly true for network operators ( [25]; [26]) and aggregators ( [27]; [28]; [29]). Medium and low voltage networks see the participation of many renewable energy producers, or prosumers, characterized by small size: in this context, the figure of the aggregator has taken hold as a subject capable of bringing into the market very diversified operators.…”
Section: Literature Backgroundmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…An overview of the state of the art in decision-making models for electricity retailers was provided in [6] and [7]. Most of the existing works focused on the integration of price-based [8]- [14] incentive-based [15]- [21], combined [22] and contract-based [23], [24] DR mechanisms. Price-based DR mechanisms assume that retail customers manage their energy consumption according to specific pricing arrangements such as time-of-use and real-time pricing.…”
Section: Randommentioning
confidence: 99%