Short Paper: Strategic Contention Resolution in Multiple Channels with Limited Feedback

Christodoulou, George; Melissourgos, Themistoklis; Spirakis, Paul G.

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-99660-8_22

Cited by 3 publications

(23 citation statements)

References 25 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…However, for the settings with 2 and 3 transmission channels, we present simple anonymous FIN-EQ protocols for up to 4 and 5 players respectively which appeared in [10]. Furthermore, these protocols are memoryless, while the only known FIN-EQ protocol in the single-channel setting ( [7]) is not.…”

Section: Our Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The theoretical works that relate the most to the current paper are the seminal paper by Fiat, Mansour and Nadav [11] and two by Christodoulou et al [7,8] which study protocols for strategic contention resolution with zero transmission costs. These works examine the case of a single transmission channel only.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…arXiv:1810.04565v1 [cs.GT] 10 Oct 2018 protocols with ternary feedback, where the user is informed about the number of pending players in each time-step regardless of whether she attempted transmission or not. Previous results on these classes of protocols have been produced only for the case of a single transmission channel ( [7,11]). Here we investigate the multiple-channels case.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Strategic Contention Resolution in Multiple Channels

Christodoulou

Melissourgos

Spirakis

2018

Approximation and Online Algorithms

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We consider the problem of resolving contention in communication networks with selfish users. In a contention game each of n ≥ 2 identical players has a single information packet that she wants to transmit using one of k ≥ 1 multiple-access channels. To do that, a player chooses a slotted-time protocol that prescribes the probabilities with which at a given time-step she will attempt transmission at each channel. If more than one players try to transmit over the same channel (collision) then no transmission happens on that channel. Each player tries to minimize her own expected latency, i.e. her expected time until successful transmission, by choosing her protocol. The natural problem that arises in such a setting is, given n and k, to provide the players with a common, anonymous protocol (if it exists) such that no one would unilaterally deviate from it (equilibrium protocol). All previous theoretical results on strategic contention resolution examine only the case of a single channel and show that the equilibrium protocols depend on the feedback that the communication system gives to the players. Here we present multi-channel equilibrium protocols in two main feedback classes, namely acknowledgement-based and ternary. In particular, we provide equilibrium characterizations for more than one channels, and give specific anonymous, equilibrium protocols with finite and infinite expected latency. In the equilibrium protocols with infinite expected latency, all players transmit successfully in optimal time, i.e. Θ(n/k), with probability tending to 1 as n/k → ∞.

show abstract

Section: Our Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Strategic Contention Resolution in Multiple Channels

Christodoulou

Melissourgos

Spirakis

2018

Approximation and Online Algorithms

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…

…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In this case she will learn whether her transmission was successful or not. One of the main results of [7] was that no acknowledgment-based protocol can be in equilibrium. In fact, it seems that many natural acknowledgment-based protocols fail to prevent users from unilaterally switching to persistent protocols that always transmit with probability 1.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

A 3-Player Protocol Preventing Persistence in Strategic Contention with Limited Feedback

Christodoulou

Gairing

Nikoletseas

et al. 2017

Algorithmic Game Theory

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this paper, we study contention resolution protocols from a game-theoretic perspective. In a recent work [7], we considered acknowledgment-based protocols, where a user gets feedback from the channel only when she attempts transmission. In this case she will learn whether her transmission was successful or not. One of the main results of [7] was that no acknowledgment-based protocol can be in equilibrium. In fact, it seems that many natural acknowledgment-based protocols fail to prevent users from unilaterally switching to persistent protocols that always transmit with probability 1. It is therefore natural to ask how powerful a protocol must be so that it can beat persistent deviators. In this paper we consider age-based protocols, which can be described by a sequence of probabilities of transmitting in each time step. Those probabilities are given beforehand and do not change based on the transmission history. We present a 3-player age-based protocol that can prevent users from unilaterally deviating to a persistent protocol in order to decrease their expected transmission time. It is worth noting that the answer to this question does not follow from the results and proof ideas of [7]. Our protocol is non-trivial, in the sense that, when all players use it, finite expected transmission time is guaranteed. In fact, we show that this protocol is preferable to any deadline protocol in which, after some fixed time, attempt transmission with probability 1 in every subsequent step. An advantage of our protocol is that it is very simple to describe, and users only need a counter to keep track of time. Whether there exist n-player age-based protocols that do not use counters and can prevent persistence is left as an open problem for future research.

show abstract

Multi-agent systems for computational economics and finance

Kampouridis

Kanellopoulos

Kyropoulou

et al. 2022

AIC

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this article we survey the main research topics of our group at the University of Essex. Our research interests lie at the intersection of theoretical computer science, artificial intelligence, and economic theory. In particular, we focus on the design and analysis of mechanisms for systems involving multiple strategic agents, both from a theoretical and an applied perspective. We present an overview of our group’s activities, as well as its members, and then discuss in detail past, present, and future work in multi-agent systems.

show abstract

Short Paper: Strategic Contention Resolution in Multiple Channels with Limited Feedback

Cited by 3 publications

References 25 publications

Strategic Contention Resolution in Multiple Channels

Strategic Contention Resolution in Multiple Channels

A 3-Player Protocol Preventing Persistence in Strategic Contention with Limited Feedback

Multi-agent systems for computational economics and finance

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About