Short Lattice Signature Scheme with Tighter Reduction under Ring-SIS Assumption

Abstract

We propose a short signature scheme under the ring-SIS assumption in the standard model. Specifically, by revisiting an existing construction [Ducas and Micciancio, CRYPTO 2014], we demonstrate lattice-based signatures with improved reduction loss. As far as we know, there are no ways to use multiple tags in the signature simulation of security proof in the lattice tag-based signatures. We address the tag-collision possibility in the lattice setting, which improves reduction loss. Our scheme generates tags from messages by constructing a scheme under a mild security condition that is existentially unforgeable against random message attack with auxiliary information. Thus our scheme can reduce the signature size since it does not need to send tags with the signatures. Our scheme has short signature sizes of 𝑂 (1) and achieves tighter reduction loss than that of Ducas et al.'s scheme. Our proposed scheme has two variants. Our scheme with one property has tighter reduction and the same verification key size of 𝑂 (log 𝑛) as that of Ducas et al.'s scheme, where 𝑛 is the security parameter. Our scheme with the other property achieves much tighter reduction loss of 𝑂 (𝑄/𝑛) and verification key size of 𝑂 (𝑛), where 𝑄 is the number of signing queries.