Shirts Today, Skins Tomorrow: Dual Contests and the Effects of Fragmentation in Self-Determination Disputes

Abstract

While theoretical models of conflict often treat actors as unitary, most selfdetermination groups are fragmented into a number of competing internal factions. This article presents a framework for understanding the ''dual contests'' that selfdetermination groups engage in-the first with their host state and the second between co-ethnic factions within groups. Using a new data set of the number of factions within a sample of self-determination groups from 1960 to 2008, the authors find that competition between co-ethnic factions is a key determinant of their conflict behavior. More competing factions are associated with higher instances of violence against the state as well as more factional fighting and attacks on co-ethnic civilians. More factions using violence increases the chances that other factions will do so, and the entry of a new faction prompts violence from existing factions in a within-group contest for political relevance. These findings have implications for both theory and policy.

New Rebels in Postconflict Settings: The Principal–Agent Dilemma of Peacebuilding

“…Figure 2B also shows a greater risk of recurrence by old rebel actors in civil conflicts with multiple actors, regardless of whether the multiple actors are other rebel factions (multiple dyads) or progovernment militias. This is to be expected as armed groups that operate in an environment that is highly competitive for members have perpetual incentives to improve institutional cohesion to avoid defection to other groups (Cunningham, Bakke and Seymour 2012;Nygård and Weintraub 2015).…”

Peace building after Civil War: A Critical Survey of the Literature and Avenues for Future Research

“…A second line of argument states that conflicts with multiple groups are longer in duration (Cunningham, 2006), more violent (Bloom, 2004;Cunningham, Bakke and Seymour, 2012), and are harder to settle (Oye, 1985). The literature points to a number of important reasons why a greater number of factions might make post-conflict stability difficult.…”

“…Cunningham (2006), for example, empirically shows that unless the number of factions is quite small, post-conflict stability will remain unlikely. Similarly, Cunningham, Bakke and Seymour (2012) suggested that all other things being equal, it would be easier to organise and maintain durable peace in divided societies of smaller number of factions than one with multiple factions. Likewise, Oye (1985) also concluded that durable peace is difficult to organise in a divided society with multiple factions.…”

The Evolution of Revolution: Is Splintering Inevitable?

“…A number of case studies have empirically explored possible causes for splintering. Several studies have found that competition among rebels, particularly when competing for the "affection" of a particular ethnic group, may encourage outbidding in extremism and in the level of violence (Bloom 2005, Pearlman 2008/2009, Cunningham 2011, Cunningham, Bakke and Seymour. 2012, and Lilja 2012.…”

“…When rebels cooperate, the number of political acts produced is controlled and restricted, thus leaving space for productive activity (Tullock, 1974and Collier and Hoeffler, 1998. However, if rebels splinter, competitive pressure increases the number of political acts produced at the expense of productive acts (Bloom 2005, Cunningham 2011, Cunningham et. al.…”