Sharing Rule Identification for General Collective Consumption Models

Abstract

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Intra‐household Experiments: A Survey

“…It is simply the function that summarizes the relationship between individual preferences and household choices. In the general formulation of the collective model (Cherchye et al, 2015), the weight λ may depend on a variety of factors including outside options for the partners, wage rates, total expenditure and prices.If λ is fixed, then the collective model is equivalent to a unitary model of the household (Vermeulen, 2002). So the collective model can be seen as a generalization of the unitary model that allows λ to vary with the environment faced by the household.Cooperative models such as McElroy and Horney (1981) and Manser and Brown (1980) represent a third approach in which further structure is placed on λ, usually by being specific about fall-back options and adding axioms about the solution to the household bargaining problem, the most common of which is the Nash bargaining solution.…”

Welfare analysis when people are different

“…Resource shares also depend on a pair of observed distribution factors y h : the relative wage of the woman vs. the man and the relative education level of the woman vs. the man. In other research (e.g., Cherchye et al ), these two variables have been shown to be positively correlated with women's resource shares. Finally, the resource share depends on logged relative prices, ln p j / p J .…”

Marital Matching, Economies of Scale, and Intrahousehold Allocations

“…As an implication, we allow the Hicksian market good and time spent on household production to be characterized by a public component, while time spent on leisure is modeled as purely private. 12 Data. We use household data drawn from the 2013 wave of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).…”