Sharing a river among satiable agents

Ambec, Stéfan; Ehlers, Lars

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2007.09.005

Cited by 104 publications

(150 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…When we take the river system (N, U) as given, we denote the collection of all characteristic functions v obtained from river situations on (N, U) with benefit functions satisfying Assumption 3.1 by G (N,U) . Ambec and Ehlers (2008) have generalized the basic one-spring river game of Ambec and Sprumont by allowing for satiable agents. This means that Assumption 3.1 is weakened by deleting the requirement that the benefit function is strictly increasing.…”

Section: River Systems With Multiple Springsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…International water law, as laid down in the Helsinki Rules of 1966 and the UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses of 1997, does neither recognize claims by upstream countries on the water caught on its territory, nor downstream nations claims of historical rights, which makes the application of negotiation theory even more difficult. The international river problem is studied in for instance Dinar (1995, 2001), Bennett, Ragland and Yolles (1998), Ambec and Sprumont (2002), Supalla et al (2002) and Ambec and Ehlers (2008).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…When for instance a coalition consists of an upstream consecutive part and a downstream consecutive part with in-between some agents outside the coalition, then every water flow sent from the upstream part to the downstream part would immediately be taken by the in-between agents. Ambec and Ehlers (2008) allow for satiable agents. For such an agent the utility is increasing up to a certain amount of water, but decreasing beyond that amount.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Therefore the welfare of a coalition of consecutive agents might be affected positively when the agents upstream of the coalition are going to cooperate with the agents downstream of the coalition, i.e., a coalition might experience positive externalities from cooperation between the upstream and downstream agents outside the coalition 3 . Ambec and Ehlers (2008) generalizes the model of Ambec and Sprumont for externalities, but still consider rivers with one spring and one sink. In this paper we consider river situations with multiple springs and allowing for externalities.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Fair Agreements for Sharing International Rivers with Multiple Springs and Externalities

Brink

Laan

Moes

2010

AIP Conference Proceedings

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In this paper we consider the problem of sharing water from a river among a group of agents (countries, cities, firms) located along the river. The benefit of each agent depends on the amount of water consumed by the agent. An allocation of the water among the agents is efficient when it maximizes the total benefits. To sustain an efficient water allocation, the agents can compensate each other by paying monetary transfers. Every water allocation and transfer schedule yields a welfare distribution, where the utility of an agent is equal to its benefit from the water consumption plus its monetary transfer (which can be negative). The problem of finding a fair welfare distribution can be modelled by a cooperative game.For a river with one spring and increasing benefit functions, Ambec and Sprumont (2002) propose the downstream incremental solution as the unique welfare distribution that is core-stable and satisfies the condition that no agent gets a utility payoff above its aspiration level. Ambec and Ehlers (2008) generalized the Ambec and Sprumont river game to river situations with satiable agents, i.e., the benefit function is decreasing beyond some satiation point. In such situations externalities appear, yielding a cooperative game in partition function form. In this paper we consider river situations with satiable agents and with multiple springs. For this type of river systems we propose the class of so-called weighted hierarchical solutions as the class of solutions satisfying several principles to be taken into account for solving water disputes. When every agent has an increasing benefit function (no externalities) then every weighted hierarchical solution is core-stable. In case of satiation points, it appears that every weighted hierarchical solution is independent of the externalities.

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Section: River Systems With Multiple Springsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Fair Agreements for Sharing International Rivers with Multiple Springs and Externalities

Brink

Laan

Moes

2010

AIP Conference Proceedings

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“…It is clear that in water stressed regions this can create tension between countries sharing a river because the population of a downstream country might (also) depend on the water inflow in the river at an upstream country. Dinar (1995, 2001), Ambec and Sprumont (2002), Ambec and Ehlers (2008), Khmelnitskaya (2010), Wang (2011), van den all use game-theoretic models to investigate the distribution of water among countries sharing an international river. In Ansink and Weikard (2011) and van den Brink, Estévez-Fernández, van der Laan and Moes (2011) a closely related axiomatic approach is followed.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%