Shared Intention

Bratman, Michael E.

doi:10.1086/293577

Cited by 444 publications

(153 citation statements)

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“…In an influential paper on the origins of shared intentionality, Tomasello and colleagues captured this challenge when they wrote “we do not know exactly how much of an understanding of intentional action is necessary for children to participate in collaborative activities” (Tomasello et al 2005). Philosophers have proposed a variety of criteria for identifying shared intentions in adults’ cooperative activity (e.g., Bratman 1992, 1993; Gilbert 2009; Searle 1990; Tuomela 2005), although they do not entirely agree among themselves about precisely what those criteria should be. Still more problematic for developmental psychologists, however, is that even those criteria on which scholars do agree entail quite complex forms of reasoning about one’s own and others’ possible actions and intentions, including complex, hierarchical, and shifting relationships between each other’s actual and inferred goals and intentions, and rational decision-making in considering and enacting the necessary actions jointly.…”

Section: Early Developments In Joint Actionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Early Developments in Joint Action

Brownell

2011

Rev.Phil.Psych.

126

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Joint action, critical to human social interaction and communication, has garnered increasing scholarly attention in many areas of inquiry, yet its development remains little explored. This paper reviews research on the growth of joint action over the first 2 years of life to show how children become progressively more able to engage deliberately, autonomously, and flexibly in joint action with adults and peers. It is suggested that a key mechanism underlying the dramatic changes in joint action over the second year of life is the ability to reflect consciously on oneself and one’s behavior and volition and correspondingly, on the behavior, goals, and intentions of others.

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Section: Early Developments In Joint Actionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Early Developments in Joint Action

Brownell

2011

Rev.Phil.Psych.

126

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“…For example, Brownell et al (2006) observed children at 19, 23, and 27 months of age engaging in peer cooperative problem solving tasks. In these tasks, each child had to pull simultaneously or sequentially one handle of a wooden box to activate a musical toy mounted on the box.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

We can work it out: an enactive look at cooperation

2014

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The past years have seen an increasing debate on cooperation and its unique human character. Philosophers and psychologists have proposed that cooperative activities are characterized by shared goals to which participants are committed through the ability to understand each other’s intentions. Despite its popularity, some serious issues arise with this approach to cooperation. First, one may challenge the assumption that high-level mental processes are necessary for engaging in acting cooperatively. If they are, then how do agents that do not possess such ability (preverbal children, or children with autism who are often claimed to be mind-blind) engage in cooperative exchanges, as the evidence suggests? Secondly, to define cooperation as the result of two de-contextualized minds reading each other’s intentions may fail to fully acknowledge the complexity of situated, interactional dynamics and the interplay of variables such as the participants’ relational and personal history and experience. In this paper we challenge such accounts of cooperation, calling for an embodied approach that sees cooperation not only as an individual attitude toward the other, but also as a property of interaction processes. Taking an enactive perspective, we argue that cooperation is an intrinsic part of any interaction, and that there can be cooperative interaction before complex communicative abilities are achieved. The issue then is not whether one is able or not to read the other’s intentions, but what it takes to participate in joint action. From this basic account, it should be possible to build up more complex forms of cooperation as needed. Addressing the study of cooperation in these terms may enhance our understanding of human social development, and foster our knowledge of different ways of engaging with others, as in the case of autism.

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“…The significance of team reasoning for game theory was, I think, first pointed out by me (Sugden 1991(Sugden , 1993. There are close connections between team reasoning and other 'we' notions used in the literature of social ontology, particularly the concepts of plural subjects (Gilbert 1989), group agency (List and Pettit 2011) and collective intentionality (Tuomela and Miller 1988;Searle 1990;Bratman 1993;Bardsley 2007). As argued by Gold and Sugden (2007), the theory of team reasoning can be interpreted as an alternative way of treating the subject matter of these other analyses of 'we'.…”

Section: Trust and Team Reasoningmentioning

confidence: 96%

Team Reasoning and Intentional Cooperation for Mutual Benefit

Sugden

2015

Journal of Social Ontology

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This paper proposes a concept of intentional cooperation for mutual benefit. This concept uses a form of team reasoning in which team members aim to achieve common interests, rather than maximising a common utility function, and in which team reasoners can coordinate their behaviour by following preexisting practices. I argue that a market transaction can express intentions for mutually beneficial cooperation even if, extensionally, participation in the transaction promotes each party's self-interest.

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Shared Intention

Cited by 444 publications

References 0 publications

Early Developments in Joint Action

Early Developments in Joint Action

We can work it out: an enactive look at cooperation

Team Reasoning and Intentional Cooperation for Mutual Benefit

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