Shared action: An existential phenomenological account

Knudsen, Nicolai Krejberg

doi:10.1007/s11097-021-09785-4

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…Medgym (2021) also stated that it is the unexpected inability to do the required spins or any spins sometimes for a particular position. It is an occurrence in which an athlete suddenly forgets his/her mind while displaying their performance ( Knudsen, 2021 ). Presumably, it might be caused by the heavy pressure and stress of the competition.…”

Section: Analysis: Input and Processmentioning

confidence: 99%

An exploration of the antecedents and mechanisms causing athletes’ stress and twisties symptom

Yu¹,

Chang²,

Shih³

2022

Heliyon

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Section: Analysis: Input and Processmentioning

confidence: 99%

An exploration of the antecedents and mechanisms causing athletes’ stress and twisties symptom

Yu¹,

Chang²,

Shih³

2022

Heliyon

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“…Bredlau connects this sense of existential orientation to Gibson's notion of affordances in a footnote (2018, p. 102n16). For recent work on "existential" selfhood, see Knudsen (2021) and Wrathall (2017). As Wrathall puts it, on an existential account of selfhood, "The 'I' picks out my particular way of polarizing affordances into solicitations to act" (2017, p. 229).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Existential selfhood in Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception

Rousse

2023

Cont Philos Rev

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This paper provides an interpretation of the existential conception of selfhood that follows from Merleau-Ponty's account of perception. On this view, people relate to themselves not by "looking within" in acts of introspection but, first, by "looking without" at the field of solicitations in which they are immersed and, eventually, in Merleau-Ponty's words, by "making explicit" the "melodic unity" or "immanent sense" of their behavior. To make sense of this, I draw out a distinction latent in Merleau-Ponty's view between a pre-reflective sense of self and a reflective self-interpretation. The former is a suite of abilities and dispositions in light of which a person is aware of and drawn to act in a situation. This sense of self undergoes transitions over time, is constitutively susceptible to moments of disorientation, and tends toward but never achieves full coherence. Reflective self-interpretation is an activity whereby someoneprovisionally and defeasibly-clarifies, articulates, and gets a better "grip" on how they are prereflectively drawn to act. I ground this interpretation in a detailed reading Merleau-Ponty's treatment of romantic love and I corroborate it by examining his account of the emergence of class-consciousness in the self-interpretation of a worker.

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Collective emotions and the distributed emotion framework

Thonhauser

2024

Phenom Cogn Sci

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The main aim of this paper is to contribute to the development of the distributed emotion framework and to conceptualize collective emotions within that framework. According to the presented account, dynamics of mutual affecting and being affected might couple individuals such that macro-level self-organization of a distributed cognitive system emerges. The paper suggests calling a distributed self-organizing system consisting of several emoters a “collective.” The emergence of a collective with a distributed affective process enables the involved individuals to enact emotions together. Accordingly, the suggestion is to conceptualize collective emotions as mereologically complex affective processes consisting of contributions which are distributed among several individuals and integrated through ongoing macro-level self-organization. To spell-out this account, the paper combines key conceptual resources from dynamical systems theory, enactive cognitive science, ecological psychology, and phenomenology. A second aim of the paper is distinguishing collective emotions from group-based emotions and suggesting an understanding of shared emotions as a subtype of collective emotions within the distributed emotion framework.

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Shared action: An existential phenomenological account

Cited by 3 publications

References 29 publications

An exploration of the antecedents and mechanisms causing athletes’ stress and twisties symptom

An exploration of the antecedents and mechanisms causing athletes’ stress and twisties symptom

Existential selfhood in Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception

Collective emotions and the distributed emotion framework

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