Share Merger Reform, Corporate Governance and Firm Value in China

Qiu, Huiyan; Yao, Shuhuai

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1275699

Cited by 7 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…Several studies have indicated that there is a positive relationship between the independence of board members and oversight of the performance and conduct of management [46] [48]. Quite the contrary, some studies suggest that the effectiveness of independent board members is politically linked and therefore their performance is not independent [49].…”

Section: Board Independence and Tax Aggressivenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Board of Directors’ Characteristics and Tax Aggressiveness: Evidence from Jordanian Listed Firms

Aburajab¹,

Maali²,

Jaradat³

et al. 2019

TEL

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This study aims to examine the relationship between Board of Director's characteristics and tax aggressiveness. Taxes are considered an additional cost to the firm and its shareholders because these taxes reduce the available cash flow. Firms tend to employ different tax aggressiveness techniques. Aggressive tax planning or strategic tax behaviors are activities generally designed to reduce tax liability that includes Tax evasion, Tax evasion and legitimate saving of taxes. This study is the first in Jordan which tests the relationship between Board of Director's characteristics (Board Duality, Board Composition and Board Independence) on tax aggressiveness. Based on a sample of 140 Jordanian firms during the period 2013-2017, this study used regression analysis to examine the effect of board composition, board independence, CEO duality, return on assets (ROA) and firm size on the tax aggressiveness. The study found that there is a negative relationship between board composition and board independence from one side, and the tax aggressiveness from the other side. Furthermore, the study found that there is a positive relationship between board duality and tax aggressiveness. Finally, both the return on assets (ROA) and the firm size variables, which were included as control variables, were found to be positively related to the tax aggressiveness.

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Section: Board Independence and Tax Aggressivenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Board of Directors’ Characteristics and Tax Aggressiveness: Evidence from Jordanian Listed Firms

Aburajab¹,

Maali²,

Jaradat³

et al. 2019

TEL

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“…Wu (2004) argues that 80 per cent of the problems in the stock market would be solved once the stock rights splitting issue is settled. Qiu and Yao (2009) report that the split share structure (tradable and non‐tradable) has impeded the development of stock markets and the transformation of the Chinese economy.…”

Section: Internal Governancementioning

confidence: 99%

“…In practice, non‐tradable shares are often transferred through private negotiations based on net assets per share and the cost of owning non‐tradable shares is much less than that of owning tradable shares (Chen and Xiong 2001). This outcome has led to discrepancies in the pricing mechanism and has hurt the stock market's price discovery process (Qiu and Yao 2009).…”

Section: Internal Governancementioning

confidence: 99%

A review of corporate governance in China

Yang

Chi

Young

2011

Asian-Pac Economic Lit

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The paper reviews the literature on internal and external corporate governance mechanisms in China. Chinese regulatory bodies have made considerable efforts to improve the corporate governance of listed firms. However, research has shown that most of the governance instruments that are effective in developed nations are less effective in China. We attribute the ineffectiveness to the large stake of the state in listed firms, strong political connections between listed firms and the government, and the lack of a truly independent judicial system. Some suggestions for making corporate governance more effective in China are provided.

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“…Considering that Chinese mutual funds have been reported to be involved in illegal operations and to have aligned with large non-tradable shareholders to take advantage of individual investors (e.g. Ping and Li, 2000;Fu and Tan, 2008;Qiu and Yao, 2009), we expect that transient mutual funds may encourage listed firms to manipulate earnings in China. Hence, we expect that:…”

Section: Hypothesis Developmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This article suggests that many mutual funds in China are shortterm speculators and that illegal operations of mutual funds could significantly harm the stability of stock markets and the interests of individual investors. Moreover, using non-tradable share reform to reveal the role of institutional investors in China, Fu and Tan (2008), Qiu and Yao (2009) and Firth et al (2010) all find that mutual fund holdings are negatively associated with the compensation rate to tradable shareholders during the reform. Despite being the largest tradable shareholder, mutual funds seem either to work with large non-tradable shareholders, or to be under political pressure from them, during the reform.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%