Shame and Selfhood

Abstract

In this article I explore the relationship between the self and the experience of shame. Drawing mainly on contributions fromthe classical phenomenological tradition, I seek to make sense of the idea that the self of shame is a globally involved self, leaving aside any mysterious connotations that the latter notion might involve. To this end, I suggest a distinction between a property- based and a structure-based account of the self of shame. According to the latter, the self of shame is typically experienced as globally involved to the extent that it reaches an acute sense of its own individuation as an irreducible self vis-_-vis others, that is, as a self whose particular situation in the world is not ascribable to another self.

Intersubjectivity and interaction as crucial for understanding the moral role of shame: a critique of TOSCA-based shame research

“…In my view, this account overlooks several dimensions of the shame experience that play a crucial role in the process of self-individuation, namely embodiment, situatedness and temporality (Guenther, 2011 ; Zahavi, 2012 ; León, 2013 ): I apprehend myself not simply as a (any) greedy individual, but as this singular one, me , put on the spot here and now. As León ( 2013 , p. 211) puts it, to feel shame is “to experience in intersubjective contexts the irreducibility of one's own particular subjective situation in the world.” Admittedly, these phenomenological dimensions don't render themselves easily to operationalization and testing. But my worry is not so much that descriptions of shame and guilt are inaccurate, but that strong moral conclusions are drawn from them.…”

“…139–146). Before dismissing shame as morally counterproductive, its crucial role in intersubjective self-constitution needs to be studied in its full complexity (see, e.g., Schneider, 1977; Hutchinson, 2008; Reddy, 2008; Williams, 2008; Rochat, 2009; Guenther, 2011; Zahavi, 2012; León, 2013; Welz, 2014). TOSCA-based research programs overlook or flatten many of these issues, and therefore can only offer a limited picture of the role of shame and guilt in morality.…”

Domesticating Bodies: The Role of Shame in Obstetric Violence

“…Recent works analyze shame in (mainly phenomenological) philosophical terms, as fundamental to the constitution of the self (Zahavi ; Deonna, Rodogno, and Teroni ; León ) and as an emotion that might be regarded as pervasive, affecting the self more intimately and essentially than does guilt: “shame concerns one's self, one's being, and not one's doing as in guilt” (Karlsson and Sjöberg , 353). Shame has also been defined as an embodied emotion, presenting clear bodily manifestations and transforming a lived‐body into a body‐object (Metcalf ; Fuchs ; Karlsson and Sjöberg ; Dolezal ).…”

Is Shame a Global Emotion?

“…The first of these comes from Bell (2011) and Thomason (2015), who suggest that shame is global not in the sense that it requires us to evaluate ourselves as shameful in every respect, but because it affectively overshadows the non-shameful parts. The second is León's (2012) idea that shame is global because it individuates us-a felt separation that, I argue, is brought about not because we failed some standard, norm, or ideal, but because in shame we experience ourselves as being rejected or abandoned.…”