2014
DOI: 10.1086/677691
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Severe Tests in Neuroimaging: What We Can Learn and How We Can Learn It

Abstract: Considerable methodological difficulties abound in neuroimaging and several philosophers of science have recently called into question the potential of neuroimaging studies to contribute to our knowledge of human cognition. These skeptical accounts suggest that functional hypotheses are underdetermined by neuroimaging data. I apply Mayo's error-statistical account to clarify the evidential import of neuroimaging data and the kinds of inferences it can reliably support. Thus, we can answer the question 'what ca… Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
2

Citation Types

0
2
0

Year Published

2018
2018
2021
2021

Publication Types

Select...
2
2

Relationship

0
4

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 4 publications
(2 citation statements)
references
References 15 publications
0
2
0
Order By: Relevance
“…The dominant tendency, as Wright (2017) has recently noted, has been one of skeptical, critical evaluation on fMRI's potential to study how cognitive function relates to the brain. While this critical stance comprises firmly skeptical positions on the interpretation of experimental results (such as Uttal [2001], or Hardcastle and Stewart [2002], and Stewart and Hardcastle [2005]) as well as more moderate warnings on the current use of the technique and its limitations (such as Klein [2010], or Aktunç [2014]), it is only recently that philosophers have begun to adopt a more constructive philosophical approach to their analysis of fMRI.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…The dominant tendency, as Wright (2017) has recently noted, has been one of skeptical, critical evaluation on fMRI's potential to study how cognitive function relates to the brain. While this critical stance comprises firmly skeptical positions on the interpretation of experimental results (such as Uttal [2001], or Hardcastle and Stewart [2002], and Stewart and Hardcastle [2005]) as well as more moderate warnings on the current use of the technique and its limitations (such as Klein [2010], or Aktunç [2014]), it is only recently that philosophers have begun to adopt a more constructive philosophical approach to their analysis of fMRI.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Cognitive neuroscientists use fMRI in conjunction with tasks and behavioral manipulations that control the cognitive processes subjects have while in the scanner. Treating this fMRI's indirect nature as an epistemic fault has motivated and grounded much of the skeptical literature (Aktunç [2014]; Uttal [2001Uttal [ , 2011; even van Orden and Paap [1997] refers to the indirect nature of the measures). Here, I join more recent efforts to articulate the positive aspects of neuroimaging experiments on the hope that, through a better understanding of fMRI's current use, a richer assessment of its role in advancing cognitive neuroscience will be possible.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%