Seven key principles of Orbital Safety management

Abstract

The main System Safety issue facing several Air Force satellite acquisition programs is non-compliance of the contractor's System Safety Program (SSP) with regard to Air Force Instruction (AFI) Orbital Safety requirements. Prior to June 2006, the majority of defense satellite contractors believed it was acceptable to limit their on-orbit hazard analysis effort to considering potential collisions between man-made objects. They believed that the routine Mission Assurance analyses, excluding hazard analysis, could cost-effectively mitigate the risk of on-orbit mishaps due to safety-critical hazards if the USAF would give them relief from requirements to deliver "non-value-added" military standard/handbook data products. This belief was not openly challenged by the SMC Central Safety Office until 2006. Today, the SMC Central Safety Office ensures all Air Force satellite acquisition programs are aware that the contractor's SSP must be AFI Orbital Safety compliant, which includes producing documented evidence that the on-orbit operations hazard analysis is completed. To facilitate this awareness leading to appropriately managed SSPs, each Air Force satellite acquisition program has an appointed System Safety Manager (SSM) who represents and reports directly to the Acquisition Program Manager. All SSMs are thoroughly familiar with the Orbital Safety "bible" AFI 91-202, Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) Supplement 1, The US Air Force Mishap Prevention Program [1]. This AFI defines the criteria for an appropriate Orbital Safety effort. However, contractors are not required to follow any AFI policy elements that are not included in the contract. Often the only tool available to the SSM to initiate an AFI compliant Orbital Safety effort is a tailored MIL-STD-882C [2] that is on contract. One might assume that this tool alone would be sufficient to guarantee an AFI compliant Orbital Safety effort. Nonetheless, defense satellite acquisition history has shown this assumption to be false. Rather, there are additional tools, in the form of seven Orbital Safety key principles, which Air Force satellite acquisition programs must adopt to ensure their contractor's System Safety Program Plan (SSPP) fully addresses AFI policies. These seven principles are best captured in the acquisition program's System Safety Management Plan (SSMP), but they also can be effectively implemented through an Air Force Operating Instruction (OI). This paper answers the question, "How can the SSMP be tailored to assure the Acquisition Program Manager that the Orbital Safety effort is AFI compliant?"

Investigation of medical error-reporting system and reporting status in Iran in 2019

“…The term “iceberg” for the phenomenon of error and reporting error was coined because the magnitude of the error in Iran is much higher than that which was previously reported, and according to the latest studies, the prevalence of medical errors is as high as 50%, However, formal reporting of errors within (hospitals) and outside the organization is far less than the results obtained in the studies. [ 6 ] In a research conducted in Iran, it was found that in addition to the high rate of medical error compared to other developed countries, the error-reporting rate was estimated to be much lower. [ 37 ]…”

“…Medical errors are a global challenge in various fields of medicine, diagnostics, surgery, and care, which, in addition to developed countries, in other countries, including Iran, is associated with greater severity and frequency, leading to more deaths and imposing greater economic burden on health systems and countries. [ 4 5 6 ]…”

The Burden of Motorcycle Crash Injuries on the Public Health System in Kisumu City, Kenya

“… 3 , 4 Motorcycle injuries strain a country’s health system and health finances, necessitating the use of additional resources and increased levels of care. 5 Previous studies from Brazil, Jamaica, Rwanda, Taiwan, and the United States reported that 65%, 73.6%, 50%, 31.6%, and 36% of motorcycle injury cases, respectively, were admitted to the hospital, of which 95%, 71.6%, 71.6%, 31.6%, and 36% required surgical interventions, respectively. 6 – 10 Furthermore, public health systems are not adequately equipped to meet the additional trauma care needs and face major gaps in coordinated emergency responses.…”