Serious Actualism

Stephanou, Yannis

doi:10.1215/00318108-2006-036

Cited by 19 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…in that it holds that it is metaphysically possible for there to be objects that do not exist)! It differs in both respects from the predicate actualist version of the doctrine that is advocated by Stephanou (2007). Of course, I take Stephanou's variant to be refuted by its failure to accommodate (N).…”

Section: Iviiimentioning

confidence: 95%

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Predicate abstraction, the limits of quantification, and the modality of existence

Percival

2010

Philos Stud

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For various reasons several authors have enriched classical first order syntax by adding a predicate abstraction operator. ''Conservatives'' have done so without disturbing the syntax of the formal quantifiers but ''revisionists'' have argued that predicate abstraction motivates the universal quantifier's re-classification from an expression that combines with a variable to yield a sentence from a sentence, to an expression that combines with a one-place predicate to yield a sentence. My main aim is to advance the cause of predicate abstraction while cautioning against revisionism. In so doing, however, I shall pursue a secondary aim by conveying mixed blessings to those who hold the view that in the logical sense of ''existence'' some existing object is such as to exist contingently. Advocates of this view must concede Williamson's recent contention that the domain of unrestricted objectual quantification could not have been narrower than it is actually, but predicate abstraction affords them some hope of accommodating this concession.Keywords Predicate abstraction Á Quantification Á Modality Á Existence Á Singular proposition Á Logical form I I.i This paper focuses on syntactic, semantic and metaphysical issues that arise from predicate abstraction. It must be emphasised at the outset, however, that predicate abstraction is distinct from the more familiar phenomenon of property abstraction.

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Section: Iviiimentioning

confidence: 95%

“…''serious'' actualism). For a recent defence of predicate actualism along these lines see Stephanou (2007). yields a demonstration of (T) that is somewhat different from Williamson's.…”

Section: Iviimentioning

confidence: 95%

Predicate abstraction, the limits of quantification, and the modality of existence

Percival

2010

Philos Stud

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“…When interpreted in terms of Kripke semantics, CONDITIONAL says that Socrates is essentially a human iff he is a human at every world where he exists, whereas UNCONDITIONAL says that Socrates is essentially a human iff he is a human at every world. Choosing CONDITIONAL over UNCONDITIONAL comes down to whether one accepts (Hanson 2018;Plantinga 1985, Stephanou 2007 or rejects (Fine 1985;Kripke 1963;Pollock 1985) the thesis of serious actualism: that something can have a property only if it exists. For UNCONDITIONAL and serious actualism jointly entail that Socrates is essentially human only if he necessarily exists, which runs against the deep-seated intuition that humans are contingent beings.…”

Section: Strong Barcan 𝐍𝑃𝑡 ∧ ∃𝑥(𝑃𝑥 ∧ ~𝐍𝑃𝑥)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Modal Conceptions of Essence

Torza

2024

The Routledge Handbook of Essence in Philosophy

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Philosophers distinguish between having a property essentially and having it accidentally. The way the distinction has been drawn suggests that it is modal in character, and so that it can be captured in terms of necessity, or cognate notions. The present chapter takes the suggestion at face value by considering a number of modal characterizations of the essential/accidental distinction that have been articulated and discussed since the early 20 th century, as well as some of the challenges that they face.

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“…For prominent defences of (SA), see Stephanou (2007), Williamson (2013b), Kment (2014) and Jacinto (2019). Note, we can also motivate (SA N ) by appealing to the weaker idea that a proposition must exist to be true.…”

Section: (N) Is Inconsistentmentioning

confidence: 99%

What does nihilism tell us about modal logic?

Masterman

2024

Philos Stud

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Brauer (Philos Stud 179:2751–2763, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-022-01793-7, 2022) has recently argued that if it is possible that there is nothing, then the correct modal logic for metaphysical modality cannot include . Here, I argue that Brauer’s argument is unsuccessful; or at the very least significantly weaker than presented. First, I outline a simple argument for why it is not possible that there is nothing. I note that this argument has a well-known solution involving the distinction between truth in and truth at a possible world. However, I then argue that once the semantics presupposed by Brauer’s argument is reformulated in terms of truth at a world, we have good reasons to think that a crucial semantic premise in Brauer’s argument should be rejected in favour of an alternative. Brauer’s argument is, however, no longer valid with this alternative premise. Thus, plausibly Brauer’s argument against is only valid, if it is not sound.

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Serious Actualism

Cited by 19 publications

References 12 publications

Predicate abstraction, the limits of quantification, and the modality of existence

Predicate abstraction, the limits of quantification, and the modality of existence

Modal Conceptions of Essence

What does nihilism tell us about modal logic?

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