Sequential Auctions with Synergy and Affiliation across Auctions

A comprehensive history of regression discontinuity designs: An empirical survey of the last 60 years

“…The authors identify close to 1000 firms with a conduct consistent with collusive behavior. Similarly, Kong (2021) studies the effects of sequential auctions with synergy, by comparing “ the second‐auction behavior of a first‐auction winner and first‐auction loser who bid the same amount in the first auction ”. Essentially, she evaluates whether correlation in bids is explained by affiliation or synergy.…”

A Model for Pricing the Construction Land Quota and Efficient Land Allocation by Using Improved Sequential Auction and Price Discount

“…Boudreau and Shunda [23] examined a novel sequential auction and indicated a distinct pattern of initial overbidding followed by underbidding. Kong [24] performed a structural analysis of sequential auctions with synergy and affiliation across auctions. Furthermore, the author proposed a flexible yet tractable sequential auction model under the private value paradigm and established its nonparametric identification, demonstrating an intuitive and general method for disentangling synergy from affiliation.…”

Relinquishing Riches: Auctions vs Informal Negotiations in Texas Oil and Gas Leasing

“…More than half of all GLO auctions receive only 1 successful bidder, and this fact seems to be known to potential bidders, as auctions that do receive more bids have substantially higher winning bids. The fact that reserve margins are much lower for the vast majority of auctions with 1 or 2 realized bidders, relative to auctions with more, suggests that either GLO has set reserve prices relatively low or that bidders expect a low, but positive probability of competition, a phenomenon studied in Kong (2017).…”

“…They showed that US government auctions captured approximately 100% of the ex ante surplus in symmetric information environments, but considerably less in asymmetric information environments. Recent work on mineral lease auctions has sought to separately identify affiliation from synergies between neighboring parcels (Kong, 2017), measure bidder uncertainty about competition (Kong, 2016), and evaluate the choice of "security" sold by the winning bidder to the auctioneer (Bhattacharya et al, 2018). An important distinction between this paper and the existing literature is that our results speak to the performance of the private leasing market, which constitutes approximately three quarters of all mineral rights in the United States (currently worth over $3 trillion).…”