Sequencing Negotiating Partners: Implications for the Two‐Level Game?

Abstract

In the late 1990s, Japan and South Korea concluded their first bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) in completely opposite sequences despite similar domestic pressures. Japan concluded an “easier” FTA with Singapore first and then concluded a more “difficult” FTA with Mexico. South Korea concluded a more difficult FTA first with Chile and then moved on to negotiate with Singapore. In this article, I analyze these cases and review the literature on bargaining and two‐level games to develop a model of how these differences in sequence account in part for the relative differences in each country's bargaining strength in their more difficult negotiations. The preexistence of the Singapore FTA eased domestic pressures to reap the benefits of entry into the bilateral FTA game. Thus, Japan could approach the more difficult FTA negotiation knowing that a “no‐agreement” outcome would not fundamentally increase domestic pressure to get into the free trade “game.” This alternative to no agreement put the Japanese in a stronger international bargaining position. South Korea negotiated its harder case knowing that the relative domestic pressure to get in the FTA game would increase without an agreement. This relatively worse bargaining position created a context in which South Korea conceded more internationally at the expense of higher side payments domestically.

Toward an Understanding of State Behavior in Prolonged International Negotiations

“…While much of the negotiation literature has been concerned with one-off negotiations, scholars have sought to elaborate on how negotiations evolve through time. Indeed, this article is not the first to note that international negotiations are not static and neither are the problems they seek to resolve (Spector & Zartman 2003, Daugberg & Swinbank 2009, Enia 2009). …”

Toward an Understanding of State Behavior in Prolonged International Negotiations

“…While much of the negotiation literature has been concerned with one-off negotiations, scholars have sought to elaborate on how negotiations evolve through time. Indeed, this paper is not the first to note that international negotiations are not static and nor are the problems they seek to resolve (Spector & Zartman 2003, Daugberg & Swinbank 2009, Enia 2009.…”

Blue, Green or Aquamarine? Taiwan and the Status Quo Preference in Cross-Strait Relations

“…The status quo is a deepening equilibrium point for Taiwan, in large part because of the staying power of the status quo and order of movement. Rather 43 With regard to prior results concerning the order of movement, see Enia (2009) on the issue of sequencing and strategies for free trade agreement (FTA) negotiations by the Japanese and South Korean governments. 44 US support for the status quo is a common assertion within the literature (e.g.…”

“…43With regard to prior results concerning the order of movement, see Enia (2009) on the issue of sequencing and strategies for free trade agreement (FTA) negotiations by the Japanese and South Korean governments.…”