Separating Introduction Effects from Selectivity Effects: The Differences in Employment Patterns of Codetermined Firms

Gralla, Rafael; Kraft, Kornelius

doi:10.1111/labr.12121

Cited by 15 publications

(20 citation statements)

References 25 publications

(41 reference statements)

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“…Furthermore, plants covered by sector‐wide bargaining agreements (SBAs) feature the lowest rate of job reallocation (the sum of either job creation or job destruction). Similar results can be seen in Gralla and Kraft (), who analyse the effects of works councils on hires and dismissals and also control for collective bargaining in their regression analyses. The differences between plants covered by firm‐level contracts (FLC) and SBA are fairly small.…”

Section: Empirical Procedure Data and Descriptive Statisticssupporting

confidence: 83%

“…Jirjahn () presents coefficients not significantly different from zero using OLS, and negative and marginally significant coefficients in a treatment effects model that controls for the endogeneity of works councils. Finally, Gralla and Kraft () present negative but mostly insignificant effects of collective agreements on firm‐level employment growth. They find significant effects on hires and dismissals, however.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 96%

“…In the difference‐in‐differences approach, we focus on plants that first conclude or terminate a collective agreement and disregard plants that have changed bargaining status multiple times . We present two models, depending on whether we disregard all plants that are covered by a collective contract throughout the entire observation period or whether we take this group into consideration using an additional indicator variable (Gralla and Kraft, ).…”

Section: The One Constant In Germanymentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

The one constant: a causal effect of collective bargaining on employment growth? Evidence from German linked‐employer‐employee data

Brändle

Goerke

2018

Scottish J Political Eco

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Section: Empirical Procedure Data and Descriptive Statisticssupporting

confidence: 83%

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 96%

Section: The One Constant In Germanymentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

The one constant: a causal effect of collective bargaining on employment growth? Evidence from German linked‐employer‐employee data

Brändle

Goerke

2018

Scottish J Political Eco

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“… See Gralla and Kraft () for a more detailed discussion on codetermination rights of works councils with respect to hires and dismissals. …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The effects of works councils on overtime hours

Gralla

Kraft

Volgushev

2016

Scottish J Political Eco

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This study analyzes the relation between works councils and overtime hours in Germany. The estimated effects differ considerably in dependence of standard contracted working time. Furthermore, we find differences across the quantiles of the overtime hours distribution and these differences between quantiles also vary between employees of establishment with and without works councils. By considering contracted working time effects and comparing conditional quantiles we find in some quantiles that employees of establishments with a works council have a higher amount of overtime hours if an employee regularly works 35 hours per week. This effect diminishes with increasing quantiles of the distribution of overtime hours. If an employee of a codetermined establishment regularly works 40 hours per week, overtime hours are reduced. This reduction becomes larger if higher quantiles are analyzed.

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“…Because we anticipate different effects for these two types of changes and because of the small panel dimension in our datasets, we estimate difference‐in‐differences (DiD) models (cf. Gralla and Kraft ; Grund and Schmitt ; and Kraft and Lang [] combining it with matching). Our estimation equation reads:

F^{- 1} false(Y_{i} t false) = β_{1} + β_{2} t r e a t m e n t g r o u p_{i} + β_{3} false(n o false) w o r k c o u n c i l_{it} + {boldX}_{boldit}^{'} γ + δ y e a r_{t} + ε_{it}

…”

Section: Data and Empirical Specificationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Sickness Absence and Works Councils: Evidence from German Individual and Linked Employer–Employee Data

Arnold

Brändle

Goerke

2018

Industrial Relations

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Using both household and linked employer-employee data for Germany, we assess the effects of non-union representation in the form of works councils on (1) individual sickness absence rates and (2) a subjective measure of personnel problems due to sickness absence as perceived by a firm's management. We find that the existence of a works council is positively correlated with the incidence and the annual duration of absence. We observe a more pronounced correlation in western Germany which can also be interpreted causally. Further, personnel problems due to absence are more likely to occur in plants with a works council. Terms of use: Documents inJEL Classification: J53, I18, M54

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Separating Introduction Effects from Selectivity Effects: The Differences in Employment Patterns of Codetermined Firms

Cited by 15 publications

References 25 publications

The one constant: a causal effect of collective bargaining on employment growth? Evidence from German linked‐employer‐employee data

The one constant: a causal effect of collective bargaining on employment growth? Evidence from German linked‐employer‐employee data

The effects of works councils on overtime hours

Sickness Absence and Works Councils: Evidence from German Individual and Linked Employer–Employee Data

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