The relationship between Britain and the European Union (EU) 1 has been, and remains, controversial. In part, this is the result of concerted eorts by both anti-and pro-EU forces to in¯uence the European policies of key political actors and to shape public opinion. This article focuses on the eorts of pro-EU forces during the 1960s and 1970s, a critical period in British±EU relations. 2 Although anti-EU forces were active during this period, it was their opponents who dominated the`great debate', for two reasons. First, for most of the period under study, pro-EU forces sought to change the status quo, promoting entry to the EU amongst a largely sceptical British public. Consequently, propaganda was essential. Second, pro-EU forces possessed more money, obtained the backing of most of the business sector and the media, and enjoyed access to the considerable power resources of the British state. Consequently, they were able to overwhelm the propaganda produced by their opponents. Given the considerable advantages enjoyed by pro-EU forces, and the lack of ®nancial, business and media support for anti-EU forces, the eorts of the latter are ignored for the purposes of this article.The impact of pro-EU propaganda campaigns in Britain has been neglected within EU studies and in the recent work on the Europeanisation of political parties, trade unions and the British state. Bringing together the few sources of information that exist, this article documents the three government-organised pro-EU propaganda campaigns of the 1960s and 1970s. It speci®cally discusses the campaigns in 1962±63 to bolster public support following Britain's ®rst application to join the EU, in 1970±71 to prepare the public for accession, and in 1974±75 to ensure continued membership in the 1975 referendum.The article begins by de®ning what is meant by propaganda, details the aforementioned campaigns within the context of the shifting European policy of the British state, and advances empirical evidence, in the form of polling data, which suggests that these campaigns were eective in changing public opinion. It then sets out three reasons why pro-EU forces resorted to propaganda rather than educating the British public about EU membership, before contrasting the 1962±75 period with the contemporary situation. It is likely that the next ®ve years will witness two further government-organised pro-EU propaganda campaigns, in an attempt to ensurè Yes' votes in any future referendums on the European constitution and the euro.