Sensitivity Actually

Abstract

A number of prominent epistemologists claim that the principle of sensitivity "play[s] a starring role in the solution to some important epistemological problems" (DeRose 2010: 161; also Nozick 1981). I argue that traditional sensitivity accounts fail to explain even the most basic data that are usually considered to constitute their primary motivation. To establish this result I develop Gettier and lottery cases involving necessary truths. Since beliefs in necessary truths are sensitive by default, the resulting cases give rise to a serious explanatory problem for the defenders of sensitivity accounts. It is furthermore argued that attempts to modally strengthen traditional sensitivity accounts to avoid the problem must appeal to a notion of safety-the primary competitor of sensitivity in the literature. The paper concludes that the explanatory virtues of sensitivity accounts are largely illusory. In the framework of modal epistemology, it is safety rather than sensitivity that does the heavy explanatory lifting with respect to Gettier cases, lottery examples, and other pertinent cases.

Replies to the Critics of Knowing and Checking: an Epistemological Investigation

“…The checking account of KC is also affected by this problem, because every method, even tossing a coin, is sensitive and safe concerning logical necessities and therefore counts as a checking method if it delivers the correct result. The standard move for solving this problem for safety, as defended by Pritchard (2009) and Blome-Tillmann (2017), is to extend the method, not only taking the particular target proposition but also propositions in the neighborhood into account. Thus, an intuitively defective method that delivers the correct result for a logical necessity n is unsafe because it could easily deliver false results concerning propositions in the neighborhood of n. A similar line of argumentation is available for sensitivity.…”

Towards an Account of Epistemic Luck for Necessary Truths

“…While some efforts have been made to tinker with safety and sensitivity conditions so as to accommodate necessary truths (Sainsbury (1997), Williamson (2000), Weatherson (2004), Becker (2007), Miščević (2007) Pritchard (2009Pritchard ( , 2012, Melchior (2017), Hirvelä (forthcoming)), Roland and Cogburn (2011) make the case, convincingly, that two of these (those of Williamson and Prichard) are not successful; we will see that all of these minor modifications run into problems, and for the same broad reasons. Blome-Tillmann (2017) argues that necessary truths present a serious problem for sensitivity-based accounts of knowledge, and Hales (2016) argues that necessary truths appear to be an intractable problem for modal accounts of luck. Things are not, I think, so bleak, but these problems suggest that a more fundamental kind of change to modal conditions such as safety and sensitivity is required.…”

A Dilemma for Globalized Safety

“…It was then suggested that, when evaluating whether the target belief is safe or not, we should also take beliefs in some other relevant propositions in similar cases into consideration. What results from this suggestion is a globalized version of the safety condition (Ball, 2016;Blome-Tillmann, 2017;Grundmann, 2020;Hirvelä, 2019;Manley, 2007;Pritchard, 2009Pritchard, , 2012aPritchard, , 2013Pritchard, , 2016Williamson, 2000Williamson, , 2009. But which propositions are relevant when evaluating whether a belief is safe?…”

“…For similar arguments, seeBecker (2007),Blome-Tillmann (2017),Collin (2018),Melchior (2017Melchior ( , 2021,Miščević (2007), andRoland and Cogburn (2011) Bernecker (2011), Broncano-Berrocal (2019,Freitag (2014),Greco (2016),Hiller and Neta (2007),Hirvelä (2019),Kripke (2011), Paterson (2020), and Stone (2013. also argue that in addition to necessary truths, modally robust contingent truths which are true in all nearby possible worlds cause the same problem for SAFETY.…”