2018
DOI: 10.1111/dpr.12324
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Send for the cavalry: Political incentives in the provision of agricultural advisory services

Abstract: This article examines how political incentives shape the implementation of agricultural advisory service reforms. Using the Uganda experience as a typical case we find that elections incentivized the Government to add a subsidized input component to the existing service. Growing pressures from local politicians, the Ministry of Agriculture and increasingly disgruntled army factions then constituted a strong and interlocking set of further incentives to revert to a recentralized, top‐down model dominated by the… Show more

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Cited by 6 publications
(3 citation statements)
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References 34 publications
(52 reference statements)
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“…Under OWC, logistical challenges are assumed to be the main barrier to technology adoption rather than information inefficiencies among farmers; this leads to a disproportionate emphasis on procuring and distributing subsidized inputs (Van Campenhout et al 2018). This emphasis further supports efforts by the regime to attract votes in rural areas (Kjaer and Joughin 2019). In this context -and despite strong relationships between CGIAR Centers and the Ministry of Agriculture -innovative PIM analyses showing how extension could be improved through ICT-enabled approaches (Van Campenhout et al 2021) have thus far received little uptake in the public sector.…”
Section: Interests Of Agrifood System Actorsmentioning
confidence: 80%
“…Under OWC, logistical challenges are assumed to be the main barrier to technology adoption rather than information inefficiencies among farmers; this leads to a disproportionate emphasis on procuring and distributing subsidized inputs (Van Campenhout et al 2018). This emphasis further supports efforts by the regime to attract votes in rural areas (Kjaer and Joughin 2019). In this context -and despite strong relationships between CGIAR Centers and the Ministry of Agriculture -innovative PIM analyses showing how extension could be improved through ICT-enabled approaches (Van Campenhout et al 2021) have thus far received little uptake in the public sector.…”
Section: Interests Of Agrifood System Actorsmentioning
confidence: 80%
“…Conversely, services targeting transaction efficiency work toward facilitating the deepening of the agricultural division of labor and scale management. Key examples include services for agricultural product sales, logistics, information [23], trading markets, and land transfers. By delegating certain agricultural production and management tasks initially performed by individual farmers to professional organizations and institutions, these services strive to achieve increased efficiency, cost-effectiveness, and quality.…”
Section: Theoretical Analysis and Research Hypothesismentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Policy changes have also affected the agricultural sector in Uganda in the past. In 2014, President Yoweri Museveni decided to abolish the National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) and replace them with Operation Wealth Creation, essentially replacing agricultural extension services by subsidized input provision (Kjaer & Joughin, 2017). If farmers interact with the market, prices also become a source | O607 VAN CAMPENHOUT ANd BIZIMUNGU of uncertainty.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%