Senatorial Discourtesy: The Senate's Use of Delay to Shape the Federal Judiciary

Outsider Participation and Influence in Judicial Confirmation Hearings, 1979-2004

“…The dependent variable for this analysis, therefore, is dichotomous, coded as "1" if one or more outsiders were allowed to testify (whether on behalf of or in opposition to the nominee) and "0" otherwise. Previous examinations of interest group influence in the confirmation process have utilized a dichotomous measure of interest group involvement rather than rely on an ordinal or count measure (Bell 2002a(Bell , 2002bScherer, Bartels, and Steigerwalt 2007). Scherer, Bartels, and Steigerwalt (2007) argued that with the nature of interest group coalitions involved in the confirmation process, most nominees either garnered substantial opposition or no opposition at all, lessening the need for a more subtle measure of interest group activity.…”

“…Many have focused on the involvement of organized interests in the confirmation of Supreme Court justices, finding that interest group lobbying has an influence on confirmation votes in the Senate (see Caldeira and Wright 1998;Segal, Cameron, and Cover 1992;Segal and Spaeth 1993). Others have focused attention on the activities of organized interests in the selection and confirmation of lower federal court judges (Bell 2002a(Bell , 2002bCohen 1998;Scherer 2005;Scherer, Bartels, and Steigerwalt 2007). These scholars have found that interest groups can influence both the length of delay in the confirmation process as well as the likelihood of confirmation success when they target nominees.…”

“…When interest groups do participate in the confirmation hearings of Supreme Court or lower court nominees, however, their involvement has been found to have an influence on both delay in the confirmation process and the likelihood of confirmation success (Bell 2002a(Bell , 2002bCohen 1998;Segal, Cameron, and Cover 1992;Segal and Spaeth 1993). Thus, interest groups may be allowed to participate in a formal capacity in the confirmation hearing process in order to provide senators with information useful to the confirmation decision.…”

“…The late 1970s represents an important turning point in the evolution of politicization in the lower court appointment process, and as such it is appropriate to begin an analysis of outsider involvement in the confirmation hearing process in 1979 (see Allison 1996;Hartley and Holmes 2002). In addition, the Senate Judiciary Committee first began keeping detailed records of judicial confirmation hearings in 1979, further justifying that year as an appropriate year to begin this analysis (Bell 2002a). Individuals who were nominated in successive congressional terms were only included more than once if a hearing was held in each term, whereas nominees with multiple hearing dates within the same term were included once, although data on outsider involvement in each hearing for that nominee were collected.…”

“…Scholars have addressed many aspects of modern judicial appointment politics, including delay in the nomination and confirmation process (Binder and Maltzman 2002;Martinek, Kemper, and Van Winkle 2002;Massie, Hansford, and Songer 2004), changes in how the president selects nominees (Goldman 1997;Goldman et al 2005), contention between the Senate and the president (Holmes and Savchak 2003), and the involvement of organized interests in the selection of lower court judges (Bell 2002a(Bell , 2002bCaldeira, Hojnacki, and Wright 2000;Cohen 1998, Flemming, MacLeod, andTalbert 1998;Scherer 2005). Central to analyses of modern judicial appointment politics has been a focus on the increased politicization and interest group involvement in the confirmation process (Bell 2002a(Bell , 2002bGoldman 2003;Hartley and Holmes 2002;Scherer 2005). These studies have found increased contention coupled with increased interest group involvement in the appointment process over the past few decades.…”