Selfish Routing in Capacitated Networks

Correa, José R.; Schulz, Andreas S.; Moses, Nicolás E. Stier

doi:10.2139/ssrn.420520

Cited by 78 publications

(151 citation statements)

References 22 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

149

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…The gap between 4/3 and 5/4 quantifies the beneficial effect of taxation on the behavior of the selfish users, specifically the reduction in their resistance to coordination. Our bound holds for heterogeneous users as well, and its proof is based on the definition of the parameter β(L) for a family of functions L by Correa, Schulz and Stier Moses [6].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Efficiency of Optimal Taxes

Karakostas

Kolliopoulos

2005

Combinatorial and Algorithmic Aspects of Networking

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract. It is well known that the selfish behavior of users in a network can be regulated through the imposition of the so-called optimal taxes on the network edges. Any traffic equilibrium reached by the selfish users who are conscious of both the travel latencies and the taxes will minimize the social cost, i.e., will minimize the total latency. Optimal taxes incur desirable behavior from the society point of view but they cause disutility to the network users since the users' total cost is in general increased [4]. Excessive disutility due to taxation may be undesirable from the societal perspective as well. In this work we examine the efficiency of taxation as a mechanism for achieving the desired goal of minimizing the social cost. We show that for large classes of latency functions the total disutility due to taxation that is caused to the users and/or the system is bounded with respect to the social optimum. In addition, we show that if the social cost takes into account both the total latency and the total taxation in the network, the coordination ratio for certain latency functions is better than the coordination ratio when taxation is not used.

show abstract

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Efficiency of Optimal Taxes

Karakostas

Kolliopoulos

2005

Combinatorial and Algorithmic Aspects of Networking

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Subsequently, Correa et al [11] introduced β(D) = 1− 1 ρ(D) and gave a simple proof of the same bound. Recently Fotakis [16] and independently Caragiannis et al [7,Theorem 23] proved that the PoA of (atomic) congestion games on parallel links with latency functions in class D is ρ(D), i.e.…”

Section: √ 3 23mentioning

confidence: 95%

“…We use the quantities ρ(D) and β(D) introduced in [27,11] respectively, to bound the PoS of symmetric network congestion games and the PoA of symmetric games on extension-parallel networks. For a non-negative and non-decreasing function…”

Section: Model and Preliminariesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Congestion Games with Linearly Independent Paths: Convergence Time and Price of Anarchy

Fotakis¹

2008

Algorithmic Game Theory

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract. We investigate the effect of linear independence in the strategies of congestion games on the convergence time of best improvement sequences and on the pure Price of Anarchy. In particular, we consider symmetric congestion games on extension-parallel networks, an interesting class of networks with linearly independent paths, and establish two remarkable properties previously known only for parallel-link games. More precisely, we show that for arbitrary (non-negative and non-decreasing) latency functions, any best improvement sequence reaches a pure Nash equilibrium in at most as many steps as the number of players, and that for latency functions in class D, the pure Price of Anarchy is at most ρ(D). As a by-product of our analysis, we obtain that for symmetric congestion games on general networks with latency functions in class D, the Price of Stability is at most ρ(D).

show abstract

“…The notion of capacity in systems with congested resources has been considered in [9] (see also references therein). Nevertheless, capacitated congestion games and the model in [9] are different.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Nevertheless, capacitated congestion games and the model in [9] are different. In our setting, we consider a finite number of atomic players and resources have an order on the users, whereas in [9], players are non-atomic and resources are not endowed with an order.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Congestion Games with Capacitated Resources

Gourvès

Monnot

Moretti

et al. 2012

Algorithmic Game Theory

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract. The players of a congestion game interact by allocating bundles of resources from a common pool. This type of games leads to well studied models for analyzing strategic situations, including networks operated by uncoordinated selfish users. Congestion games constitute a subclass of potential games, meaning that a pure Nash equilibrium emerges from a myopic process where the players iteratively react by switching to a strategy that diminishes their individual cost. With the aim of covering more applications, for instance in communication networks, we extend congestion games to the setting where every resource is endowed with a capacity which possibly limits its number of users. From the negative side, we show that a pure Nash equilibrium is not guaranteed to exist in any case and we prove that deciding whether a game possesses a pure Nash equilibrium is NP-complete. Our positive results state that congestion games with capacities are potential games in the well studied singleton case. Polynomial algorithms that compute these equilibria are also provided.

show abstract

Selfish Routing in Capacitated Networks

Cited by 78 publications

References 22 publications

The Efficiency of Optimal Taxes

The Efficiency of Optimal Taxes

Congestion Games with Linearly Independent Paths: Convergence Time and Price of Anarchy

Congestion Games with Capacitated Resources

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About