Self-respect and public reason

Whitfield, Gregory

doi:10.1080/13698230.2015.1031933

Cited by 3 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 36 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Recent Rawlsian contributions seek to base demanding requirements of political equality, and the coercive enforcement of public reason, on self-respect. See, respectively, Krishnamurthy 2013 and Whitfield 2017.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…12.For Rawlsian accounts of self-respect based on awareness of these two moral powers, see Doppelt 2009; Krishnamurthy 2013; and Whitfield 2017.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…31.Krishnamurthy (2013, 192, and n. 13, 19, 26) focuses on insults and disrespect; Doppelt speaks about ‘attaining respect’, and enjoying ‘reasonable social bases of recognition and respect’ (2009, 152), apparently interchangeably with ‘social bases of self -respect’. Whitfield argues that institutional failures to affirm individuals’ equal status are eo ipso undermining self-respect, because he regards the fact that some people are resilient as a mere psychological contingency (2017, 450f).…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Real self-respect and its social bases

Schemmel

2019

Can. J. of Philosophy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Many theories of social justice maintain that concern for the social bases of self-respect grounds demanding requirements of political and economic equality, as self-respect is supposed to be dependent on continuous just recognition by others. This paper argues that such views miss an important feature of self-respect, which accounts for much of its value: self-respect is a capacity for self-orientation that is robust under adversity. This does not mean that there are no social bases of self-respect that such theories ought to incorporate. It means that they are different: they consist of the motivational and epistemic resources needed to develop and maintain such robustness.

show abstract

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…12.For Rawlsian accounts of self-respect based on awareness of these two moral powers, see Doppelt 2009; Krishnamurthy 2013; and Whitfield 2017.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Real self-respect and its social bases

Schemmel

2019

Can. J. of Philosophy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…1313 Gregory Whitfield (2017) has explored this connection. However, he focuses on the threat to self‐respect caused by nonpublic reasons in favor of coercive laws.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Public reason as a social basis of self‐respect

Spector

2020

Journal of Social Philosophy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The idea of public reason has become increasingly influential in the liberal tradition as a result of its development in the work of John Rawls (1993, 217). This idea involves a standard of legitimacy that requires that certain laws and institutions be acceptable to all reasonable people, regardless of their moral, philosophical, or religious views. 1 Many philosophers such as Robert Audi (1993, 701), Charles Larmore (1996, 37), 2 Christopher Eberle (2002, 54), Gerald Gaus (2003, 146), 3 and Rawls himself (1993, 217) have argued that the idea of public reason is adequately motivated by the need to justify the exercise of coercive power to reasonable persons who do not agree on the truth of any particular conception of the good. On this traditional view, the main purpose of public reason is to legitimate coercion against individuals. In recent years, however, some authors have offered alternative accounts. Thus, James Boettcher (2007, 223-49) argues that the idea of public reason can find justification in the concept of respect for persons as fellow citizens. Andrew Lister (2008, 278) holds that that the distinctive contribution of public reason is to constitute a "relationship of civic friendship." Colin Bird (2014, 202) claims that the case for public reason depends on individuals' civic standing as "free and equal co-legislators." Finally, Jonathan Quong (2014, 273) holds that we should see public reason as grounded in the value of "fairness." In this paper, I show why the traditional, coercion-based, view is problematic, and offer a different account of public reason: the "self-respect account." In addition, I argue that this account is capable

show abstract

Status as an Equal

Cass¹

2021

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Self-respect and public reason

Cited by 3 publications

References 36 publications

Real self-respect and its social bases

Real self-respect and its social bases

Public reason as a social basis of self‐respect

Status as an Equal

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About