Self-recognition in chimpanzees and orangutans, but not gorillas

Suarez, Susan D.; Gallup, Gordon G.

doi:10.1016/s0047-2484(81)80016-4

Cited by 223 publications

(193 citation statements)

References 23 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

182

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…The subjects' task was to indicate as quickly as possible which face it was by pressing one of three buttons with their right hand in one condition and left in another (resulting in six conditions-three types of faces times two hands). Results indicated a significant reaction time advantage for the self faces when subjects pressed the button with their left hand, which (2000); Keenan et al (1999Keenan et al ( , 2000Keenan et al ( , 2001Keenan et al ( , 2003; Kircher et al (2000Kircher et al ( , 2001; Turk et al Functional uniqueness/ independence Reed & Farah (1995) Self-reference effect (various authors); Klein et al (2002) De Renzi et al (1987); Hodges & McCarthy (1993) Species specificity Gallup (1970Gallup ( , 1979; Suarez & Gallup (1981) is primarily controlled by the right hemisphere-that is, their reaction times for this condition were significantly faster than their reaction times in any of the other five conditions. In another study, subjects were shown morphed images of their own face and the face of a famous person (Keenan et al, 2000), similar to the design used in Keenan et al's (2003) patient study.…”

Section: Face Recognitionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Is Self Special? A Critical Review of Evidence From Experimental Psychology and Cognitive Neuroscience.

Gillihan¹,

Farah²

2005

Psychological Bulletin

395

304

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Varied research findings have been taken to support the claim that humans' representation of the self is "special," that is, that it emerges from systems that are physically and functionally distinct from those used for more general purpose cognitive processing. The authors evaluate this claim by reviewing the relevant literatures and addressing the criteria for considering a system special, the various operationalizations of self, and how the studies' findings relate to the conclusions drawn. The authors conclude that many of the claims for the special status of self-related processing are premature given the evidence and that the various self-related research programs do not seem to be illuminating a unitary, common system, despite individuals' subjective experience of a unified self.A basic goal of information-processing psychology is to characterize the computational architecture of the mind, that is, to delineate the components of the information-processing system and describe their functions. Within this common framework, theories differ according to how many distinct components are posited and how specialized their functions are. In the case of some kinds of human information processing, claims of extreme specialization have been made. Language, for example, is often said to be a product of systems that are physically and functionally distinct from those used for more general-purpose cognitive processing-in other words, language has been claimed to be special. Evidence for the claim that language is special includes its reliance on a network of perisylvian brain areas that are not needed for nonlinguistic sound recognition or vocalization and its species specificity. Face recognition is also considered special by many because it relies on parts of ventral visual cortex that are not needed for visual recognition of nonface objects and because face representation is more holistic than the representation of other objects.

show abstract

Section: Face Recognitionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Is Self Special? A Critical Review of Evidence From Experimental Psychology and Cognitive Neuroscience.

Gillihan¹,

Farah²

2005

Psychological Bulletin

395

304

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Macaques (Anderson 1986), elephants (Povinelli 1989), and parrots (Pepperberg et al 1995) have all been shown to use mirrors appropriately, but only great apes have been shown to pass the classic mark test. This includes at least some chimpanzees, bonobos, orang-utans, and gorillas (Gallup 1970;Suarez and Gallup 1981;Patterson 1991;Hyatt and Hopkins 1994). Event-matching is clearly present in these species.…”

Section: Self Awareness: Mirror Self-recognitionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The rise of the metamind

Suddendorf¹

2000

The Descent of MindPsychological Perspectives on Hominid Evolution

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…Investigations have been directed at concept formation (Vonk, 2002(Vonk, , 2003Vonk & MacDonald, 2002), food processing (Byrne & Byrne, 1993;Pika & Tomasello, 2001), learning (Fischer, 1962;Fischer & Kitchener, 1965;Patterson & Tzeng, 1979;Rumbaugh & Steinmetz, 1971;Yerkes, 1927), linguistic skills (Patterson, 1978), mirror self-recognition (InoueNakamura, 1997; Ledbetter & Basen, 1982;Shillito, Gallup, & Beck, 1999;Suarez & Gallup, 1981;Swartz & Evans, 1994), problem-solving (Robbins, Compton, & Howard, 1978), social cognition (e.g., Maestripieri, Ross, & Megna, 2002;Mitchell, 1991;Stoinski, Wrate, Ure, & Whiten, 2001), and tool use (Fontaine, Moisson, & Wickings, 1995;Nakamichi, 1999). Our focus will be only on issues of memory, especially those relevant to the understanding of episodic memory and mental time travel.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%