Self-Preferencing, Quality Provision, and Welfare in Mobile Application Markets

Teng, Xuan

doi:10.2139/ssrn.4259639

SSRN Journal

2022

DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.4259639

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Self-Preferencing, Quality Provision, and Welfare in Mobile Application Markets

Xuan Teng

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“…For example, a recent empirical study by XuanTeng (2022) examined self-preferencing in the US app store markets from April to August 2019. It found that Apple's ownership gave it an advantage over independent apps in the search results.…”

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Taming Digital Influence: Hypernudging and the Role for European Competition Law

Morozovaitė

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This dissertation examines hypernudging – a sophisticated form of user influencing online - within the context of big technology companies and their prominent role in shaping digital markets. Digital platforms are increasingly adopting user influencing practices to encourage engagement and spending, sometimes to the detriment of the users. This research takes the form of a legal and normative assessment of the role that European competition law should play in addressing the challenges posed by hypernudging by big technology companies. The thesis unfolds through three interrelated themes. Firstly, it defines hypernudging in its multiple aspects by establishing a consolidated framework and situating these practices within the transdisciplinary debate on user influencing, underscoring the risks of individual and collective harm. Secondly, the study examines hypernudging in the context of the abuse of dominance prohibition under European competition law. Using case studies in the ad tech and voice assistant markets, it shows that hypernudging can facilitate exclusionary self-preferencing behavior by powerful firms. Furthermore, a case study on political microtargeting takes a normative perspective to question the boundaries of European competition law. It underlines the need for balancing between efficiency and democratic considerations, particularly as big technology companies extend their influence into the political sphere. Finally, hypernudging is situated within the EU's digital policy agenda, highlighting the complexities policymakers face in regulating digital markets. While existing competition law theories can be applied to hypernudging, a normative stance advocates for an expanded role that facilitates the co-creation of digital markets in line with EU values.

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Taming Digital Influence: Hypernudging and the Role for European Competition Law

Morozovaitė

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Self-Preferencing, Quality Provision, and Welfare in Mobile Application Markets

Cited by 1 publication

References 71 publications

Taming Digital Influence: Hypernudging and the Role for European Competition Law

Taming Digital Influence: Hypernudging and the Role for European Competition Law

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