Self-organization, free energy minimization, and optimal grip on a field of affordances

Bruineberg, Jelle; Rietveld, Erik

doi:10.3389/fnhum.2014.00599

Cited by 436 publications

(477 citation statements)

References 56 publications

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“…Environmental properties are considered in relation to the animal's size or action capabilities rather than via measurements of scale such as metres and kilogrammes. More recently, theoreticians (e.g., Bruineberg & Rietveld, 2014;Rietveld & Kiverstein, 2014) who have focused on affordances have built on their relational nature to suggest that they are also resources that are available for animals (in our case games players) to use. The landscape of affordances available in junior sport environments therefore offers or invites individual players to develop a range of action possibilities to achieve 'fitness' to the specific environment.…”

Section: Ecological Dynamics Nonlinear Pedagogy and The Constraint-lmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Constraint-Led Approach to Coaching and Teaching Games: Can going back to the future solve the «they need the basics before they can play a game» argument?

Renshaw

Moy

2018

AGORA EFyD

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Despite the continued popularity of Games Centred Approaches with tertiary level academics, the take-up by practitioners has been limited. In a recent survey of entry level HPE students undertaken at our university, 95% reported that they had received a predominantly traditional experience in school physical education lessons. This finding is in line with a common response when we engage with practitioners who strongly advocate the need for games players to learn the basics before they can play a game. In this paper we will present concepts and practical exemplars demonstrating a Constraint-Led Approach (CLA) to games teaching and coaching. We will show that adopting a CLA has the potential to provide practitioners with the tools to address this significant barrier and potentially enhance the adoption of games-based approaches. We will argue that the technique-tactics dichotomy is a redundant framework as the intentions and actions of learners is a function of their current action capabilities. However, we will also propose that games-based practitioners need to develop pedagogical practices that initially develop intra-individual-environment co-ordination before moving onto a more traditional focus on inter-individual-environment co-ordination (i.e., how teams organise to solve games-based problems). A key focus will be on the need to consider the mutuality of the individual and the environment and how backyard games allied to CLA methods can help practitioners design better games based programmes that will meet the needs of all games players irrespective of age or ability level.

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Section: Ecological Dynamics Nonlinear Pedagogy and The Constraint-lmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Constraint-Led Approach to Coaching and Teaching Games: Can going back to the future solve the «they need the basics before they can play a game» argument?

Renshaw

Moy

2018

AGORA EFyD

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“…If one adopts such an enactive/ecological view of mind and applies it to the PP framework, the predictive brain can be considered to act as the categorical basis for cognition by enabling direct personal level cognitive contact with an organism's environment (Anderson and Chemero 2013;Bruineberg and Rietveld 2014;Downey 2017;cf. McDowell 1994).…”

Section: Does Cognition Concern Proximal or Distal States Of Affairs?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Predictive processing and the representation wars: a victory for the eliminativist (via fictionalism)

Downey

2017

Synthese

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In this paper I argue that, by combining eliminativist and fictionalist approaches toward the sub-personal representational posits of predictive processing, we arrive at an empirically robust and yet metaphysically innocuous cognitive scientific framework. I begin the paper by providing a non-representational account of the five key posits of predictive processing ("prediction-signal", "error-signal", "prior", "likelihood", and "posterior probability"). Then, I motivate a fictionalist approach toward the remaining indispensable representational posits of predictive processing, and explain how representation can play an epistemologically indispensable role within predictive processing explanations without thereby requiring that representation metaphysically exists. Finally, I outline four consequences of accepting this approach and explain why they are beneficial: (1) we arrive at a victory for metaphysical eliminativism in the 'representation wars'; (2) my account fits with extant empirical practice; (3) my account provides guidance for future research; and, (4) my account provides the beginnings of a response to Mark Sprevak's IBE problem for fictionalist approaches toward sub-personal representation.

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“…In this section I am going to suggest that it occurs via the learning of new perceptual sensorimotor skills. Enactive and ecological theories of conscious perception take an organism's ability to perceive to be predicated on its possession and exercise of sensorimotor skills (Anderson 2014;Barrett 2011;Bruineberg and Rietveld 2014;Chemero 2016;O'Regan 2011;Noë 2004;Thompson 2007). They explain perception to be predicated on the possession and exercise of the knowledge-how required to become perceptually related to the environment.…”

Section: Hurley's Criteriamentioning

confidence: 99%

Split-brain syndrome and extended perceptual consciousness

Downey

2017

Phenom Cogn Sci

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In this paper I argue that split-brain syndrome is best understood within an extended mind framework and, therefore, that its very existence provides support for an externalist account of conscious perception. I begin by outlining the experimental aberration model of split-brain syndrome and explain both: why this model provides the best account of split-brain syndrome; and, why it is commonly rejected. Then, I summarise Susan Hurley's argument that splitbrain subjects could unify their conscious perceptual field by using external factors to stand-in for the missing corpus callosum. I next provide an argument that split-brain subjects do unify their perceptual fields via external factors. Finally, I explain why my account provides one with an experimental aberration model which avoids the problems typically levelled at such views, and highlight some empirical predictions made by the account. The nature of split-brain syndrome has long been considered mysterious by proponents of internalist accounts of consciousness. However, in this paper I argue that externalist theories can provide a straightforward explanation of the condition. I therefore conclude that the ability of externalist accounts to explain split-brain syndrome gives us strong reason to prefer them over internalist rivals.

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Self-organization, free energy minimization, and optimal grip on a field of affordances

Cited by 436 publications

References 56 publications

A Constraint-Led Approach to Coaching and Teaching Games: Can going back to the future solve the «they need the basics before they can play a game» argument?

A Constraint-Led Approach to Coaching and Teaching Games: Can going back to the future solve the «they need the basics before they can play a game» argument?

Predictive processing and the representation wars: a victory for the eliminativist (via fictionalism)

Split-brain syndrome and extended perceptual consciousness

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