Self-monitoring in patients with schizophrenia

Knoblich, Günther; Stottmeister, Frank; Kircher, Tilo

doi:10.1017/s0033291704002454

Cited by 105 publications

(69 citation statements)

References 31 publications

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“…In a situation when there is no difference, action or thought is classified as produced by the self. In such patients, this process may be impaired, the consequence of which is inappropriate assignment of the origin of actions or thoughts [22].…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Usefulness of models in the process of qualifying contents as delusional – case analysis

Janík¹,

Biegańska²

2015

Arch Psych Psych

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SummaryAim: The purpose of this study was to attempt to apply a two-factor diagnostic model for delusional content qualification. Method: This is a case study of a patient with a history of ischaemic stroke who developed delusional beliefs. Results:The two-factor diagnostic model has shown promising applicability in the case analysed, however, guidance is provided on the need to expand and change some of the criteria with the possibility of complementing the model with elements from neurobiological models. Conclusions:The case analysis allowed us to point out the strengths and weaknesses of the diagnostic model discussed. We propose that strictly neurobiological diagnostic categories should be replaced by those that allow the diagnosis of cognitive deficits. We also hypothesise that problems with inference, as one of the main factors contributing to delusions, should not be analysed only in terms of the damage to the right hemisphere. delusions / delusional models / diagnostic clues / case studyThis article analyses the usefulness of several models of delusions described in the literature in the diagnostic process of a patient with a history of ischaemic stroke affecting the right hemisphere. Previous studies hypothesised on the process of delusional content formation and verified the delusional contents using available diagnostic procedures. Creating models to explain how certain disorders develop has two main advantages: it shows how a specific disorder forms and indicates the main types of factors involved in this process. Thus, it enables a better understanding of the essence of the disorder and helps formulate diagnostic guidelines.Models of this type can have various forms: from a simple presentation of a causal relationship between a factor and a disorder to complex, multifactorial network models, in which each element can potentially interact with the other. The task of theoretical models of delusions will be to indicate the main factors necessary for the emergence of delusional beliefs and to describe the dynamics of the process leading from these factors to delusion formation. The need to create such models primarily stems from a strong internal differentiation within the category of beliefs determined as delusions. Due to this heterogeneity, it is diagnostically interesting to identify and differentiate such factors depending on the contents of delusions.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Usefulness of models in the process of qualifying contents as delusional – case analysis

Janík¹,

Biegańska²

2015

Arch Psych Psych

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“…It is also supported by evidence that this awareness is absent or delayed when the brain areas responsible for these predictions are temporarily disturbed using transcranial magnetic stimulation methods or are damaged (Haggard and Magno, 1999;Desmurget & Sirigu, 2009). Evidence for claim (2) -that the sense of agency also depends on the congruence between predictions and sensory reafferences -comes from studies showing that gradually disrupting the consequences of actions by introducing temporal delays or spatial inconsistencies gradually reduces the sense of agency (Fourneret & Jeannerod, 1998;Knoblich, Stottmeister, & Kircher, 2004;Leube et al, 2003;Sato & Yasuda, 2005;Sato, 2009). …”

Section: The Sense Of Agency For Individual Actions: Sources and Mechmentioning

confidence: 96%

How does it feel to act together?

Pacherie

2013

Phenom Cogn Sci

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“…MP and MA as tested in study 1 may be influenced in the highly trained processing of upright bodies, and it may not transfer to less trained postures such as inverted bodies that have been shown to decrease performance in the perception of body postures (Reed et al, 2003) and biological motion (Cutting, Moore, & Morrison, 1988), as well as self-attribution of arm actions Knoblich, Stottmeister, & Kircher, 2004). Moreover, performance may also be dependent on the perspective (David et al, 2006;Vogeley & Fink, 2003) or direction from which the virtual body is shown as MA during goal-directed arm movements has been shown to decrease if the direction of the virtual arm movement is rotated by 180 • (van den Bos & Jeannerod, 2002).…”

Section: Studymentioning

confidence: 98%

The limits of agency in walking humans

et al. 2010

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a b s t r a c tAn important principle of human ethics is that individuals are not responsible for actions performed when unconscious. Recent research found that the generation of an action and the building of a conscious experience of that action (agency) are distinct processes and crucial mechanisms for self-consciousness. Yet, previous agency studies have focussed on actions of a finger or hand. Here, we investigate how agents consciously monitor actions of the entire body in space during locomotion. This was motivated by previous work revealing that (1) a fundamental aspect of self-consciousness concerns a single and coherent representation of the entire spatially situated body and (2) clinical instances of human behaviour without consciousness occur in rare neurological conditions such as sleepwalking or epileptic nocturnal wandering. Merging techniques from virtual reality, full-body tracking, and cognitive science of conscious action monitoring, we report experimental data about consciousness during locomotion in healthy participants. We find that agents consciously monitor the location of their entire body and its locomotion only with low precision and report that while precision remains low it can be systematically modulated in several experimental conditions. This shows that conscious action monitoring in locomoting agents can be studied in a fine-grained manner. We argue that the study of the mechanisms of agency for a person's full body may help to refine our scientific criteria of selfhood and discuss sleepwalking and related conditions as alterations in neural systems encoding motor awareness in walking humans.

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Self-monitoring in patients with schizophrenia

Abstract: These results support the claim that a failure of self-monitoring may underlie the core symptoms of schizophrenia.

Cited by 105 publications

References 31 publications

Usefulness of models in the process of qualifying contents as delusional – case analysis

Usefulness of models in the process of qualifying contents as delusional – case analysis

How does it feel to act together?

The limits of agency in walking humans

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