Self‐Interest, Symbolic Attitudes, and Support for Public Policy: A Multilevel Analysis

Abstract

This paper examines the role of self-interest and symbolic attitudes as predictors of support for two domestic policy issues-guaranteed jobs and incomes and national health insurance-in the American National Election Survey (ANES) between 1972 and 2004. As was the case in 1976 when Sears, Lau, Tyler, and Allen (1980) first explored this topic, symbolic attitudes continue to be much more important predictors of policy attitudes than various indicators of self-interest over the 30 years we analyze. We explore this finding further to determine whether any individual/internal and external/contextual variables affect the magnitude of self-interest effects on policy support. Five possible internal moderators of self-interest effects are examined: (1) political knowledge, (2) issue publics, (3) political values, (4) social identifications, and (5) emotions, but none are found to boost the magnitude of the self-interest effect. However, we do find some evidence that contextual variables representing the social/information environment moderate the impact of selfinterest on public opinion.

Relationship between leadership perception and engagement in workplace deviant behavior

“…The behaviors include production and property deviance (Robinson & Bennet, 1995). Overall, organizational deviance is divided into two different forms and the acts violating organizational norms and causing massive financial loss including low in productivity and bad organizational performance (Kuvaas, 2009;Lau & Heldman, 2009;Miller, 1999). Production deviance involves behaviors such as taking an excessive break, work slowly, and focus on self-interest.…”

Paro y voto: ¿afecta al voto la experiencia de desempleo?

“…Muchos de ellos, desde los clásicos trabajos de Kinder y Kiewiet (1979, 1981 y Lewis-Beck (1988), han concluido que la situación económica personal influye menos que la valoración de la situación económica general o incluso que su efecto es nulo. Este hallazgo es congruente con las tesis de que el autointerés tiene un papel muy limitado en la explicación del comportamiento político en comparación con las «creencias y actitudes simbólicas» (Sears et al, 1980;Sears y Funk, 19901991;Lau y Heldman, 2009) y de que la gente tiende a responsabilizarse a sí misma, y no a actores externos como los políticos, por su situación económica personal Brody y Sniderman, 1977) (3).…”

“…(3) Aunque se debe tener en cuenta que la mayoría de los estudios que han dado sustento empírico a estas tesis se refieren a Estados Unidos, en cuya cultura política tienen un especial predominio las orientaciones económicas individualistas (Feldman, 1982); que algunos de ellos han encontrado que bajo determinadas condiciones (información adecuada, «apuestas altas», inmediatez temporal; prioridad del tema en la agenda personal) y en ciertos contextos (situación material adversa) la relevancia política de las motivaciones autointeresadas es mayor (Chong et al, 2001;Kumlin, 2004;Lau y Heldman, 2009;Hunt et al, 2010;Young et al, 1987); y que el voto sociotrópico es compatible con una orientación egoísta, pues la clave de la distinción sociotrópico/egocéntrico es la información relevante y el objeto al que ésta se refiere, no la motivación de la acción (Kiewiet y Lewis-Beck, 2011).…”

Symbols, Self-Interest and Labour Policy Attitudes: Evidence from Saskatchewan

“…Symbolic predispositions also seem to shape individuals' opinions about matters where the personal costs and benefits would seem to be rather clear. Examining 32 years of data on opinions about guaranteed jobs and income as well as national health insurance, Lau and Heldman (2009) find substantial evidence for the influence of symbolic factors. Similarly, in a multi-nation study of public attitudes toward government privatization of electric utilities, Battaglio and Legge (2009) found that symbolic predispositions had stronger effects than selfinterest.…”

“…What strikes many researchers, however, are the relatively modest overall effects of self-interest on policy opinions (Sears and Funk, 1991;Lau and Heldman, 2009). There are certainly examples where self-interest is not the pivotal factor in public policy preferences and, instead, symbolic considerations are dominant.…”