Self-Enforcing Partisan Procedures

Diermeier, Daniel; Prato, Carlo; Vlaicu, Razvan

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3055397

Cited by 3 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…First, risk aversion plays a prominent role in the literature on the endogenous choice of proposal rights (e.g., Diermeier et al, 2017, 2020). In our model, delegation reduces the uncertainty over who will be the proposer compared to our benchmark case of equal recognition probabilities.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In the case of Jeon (2015), a legislator’s recognition probability is an increasing function of his previous period’s share of the dollar. Diermeier and Feddersen (1998), Diermeier et al (2015, 2017, 2020), and Diermeier and Vlaicu (2011) all considered a variety of legislative bargaining models: distributional and spatial; repeated and one-shot. These models share the feature that there is an organizational stage in which all of the legislators vote on who is to be accorded proposal rights; whether these rights are revocable depends on the model being considered.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…These models share the feature that there is an organizational stage in which all of the legislators vote on who is to be accorded proposal rights; whether these rights are revocable depends on the model being considered. When, as in Diermeier et al (2017, 2020), policy preferences are not known at the procedural decision stage and the legislators are risk averse, in equilibrium, procedural rights are concentrated in the hands of one or two of the majority party legislators so as to minimize policy choice volatility. In our model, legislators are not risk averse, and there is no uncertainty about their preferences.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…In our model, legislators are not risk averse, and there is no uncertainty about their preferences. Diermeier et al (2020) and Diermeier and Vlaicu (2011) show how preference similarity in a spatial model can bias the outcome away from the median ideal point of the legislature towards the median ideal point of the majority party because of the desire of legislators to choose recognition probabilities that attenuate policy uncertainty. In our model, the distribution of shares is not one-dimensional, so there is no natural median alternative.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

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Legislative bargaining and partisan delegation

Choate

Weymark

Wiseman

2020

Journal of Theoretical Politics

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We use an extension of the Baron–Ferejohn model of legislative bargaining in which there are three legislators, two of whom have partisan ties, to analyze the division of a fixed political resource in a majoritarian legislature. A legislator’s preferences depend on the shares that he and any copartisan receive. We ask whether there are circumstances under which a partisan legislator is willing to delegate proposal-making authority to a party leader so as to take advantage of the special proposal rights accorded by the legislature to this office rather than retaining equal-recognition proposal rights for himself. We show that this is the case only if (i) the leader’s proposal recognition probability is larger than the probability that one of the partisans is recognized when the legislators act independently, (ii) the value of partisan affiliation is sufficiently high, and (iii) the legislators are sufficiently impatient. We explore the relevance of these results to ongoing debates regarding the role and effect of parties and party leaders in Congress.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%