2014
DOI: 10.1177/0951629814533840
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Self-enforcing clientelism

Abstract: Political clientelism is a dyadic relation in which a politician (the patron) gives material goods and services to a citizen (the client), in exchange for political support. If, at different stages of this relationship, both the patron and the client have incentives to defect and not honor informal agreements, what makes clientelism self-enforcing? The following paper presents a game-theoretical model of political clientelism in which a candidate disciplines a majority of voters through the promise of a future… Show more

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Cited by 19 publications
(11 citation statements)
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“…Voters' interests are aligned with the party's. The nature of the goods provided to voters can make clientelism self-enforcing by aligning recipients' interests with the electoral success of the party providing the benefits (Gallego 2015). This is most likely for the subset of exchanges that are iterated, involving benefits that (a) have ongoing payoffs and (b) may cease if another party wins.…”
Section: Imperfectly Solving the Commitment Problem Without Monitoringmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Voters' interests are aligned with the party's. The nature of the goods provided to voters can make clientelism self-enforcing by aligning recipients' interests with the electoral success of the party providing the benefits (Gallego 2015). This is most likely for the subset of exchanges that are iterated, involving benefits that (a) have ongoing payoffs and (b) may cease if another party wins.…”
Section: Imperfectly Solving the Commitment Problem Without Monitoringmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The model does not consider politicians competing in elections. This implies, among other things, that we do not consider the credibility problems often addressed in clientelism models (Gallego, 2015;Keefer and Vlaicu, 2008;Robinson and Verdier, 2013;Stokes, 2005). The model is best thought of as representing informal political mobilization rather than formal voting, i.e., a model about grassroots mobilization in the pursuit of broad-based redistribution.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…All bribed voters who oppose the buyer’s candidate have incentives to free-ride on others’ compliance while voting for their preferred choices. A major difference with previous models that use repeated interactions to sustain vote buying, like the ones in Stokes (2005) and Gallego (2012), is that this paper’s model allows us to explore in detail the bribed voters’ collective action problem.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%