Self-consciousness, the other and Hegel's dialectic of recognition

Kain, Philip J.

doi:10.1177/019145379802400505

Cited by 7 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…“The deeply meaningful paradox illustrated here is the master's failure to see that he needed the other to recognize the fact that he does not need the other at all” (Carr, 2003a, p. 121; see also Bernstein, 1971, pp. 26‐8; Kain, 1998, p. 111).…”

Section: Neither Self Nor Other; Neither Master Nor Slave: Hegel' Relationships Of Middlesmentioning

confidence: 99%

To have to halve to have: “Being” in the middle in changing time's space

Lapp¹,

Carr

2006

Journal of Organizational Change Management

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PurposeThe aim of this paper is explore consequences of ambivalence and ambiguity on self‐concept, decision‐making, and quality of interrelationships between management and employees in one for‐profit organisation.Design/methodology/approachData were re‐read to reveal that organisational members were constantly engaged in the process of changing their perceptions of “who” and “what” were “good” and “bad” in reaction to environmental change impacts.FindingsThe paper finds that philosophically, “splitting” is an age‐old form of decision‐making; psychodynamically, “splitting” is not necessarily a signal to a pathology but instead is merely an initiator of ambiguity and ambivalence that leverages change; from a change management perspective, “splitting” can reinforce polarisation that can impede the desire to engage in continual change; and predictions and perceptions of change consequences underscore both the quality and quantity of “splitting” in regard to polarisation. “Splitting” is an integral defense and offense change mechanism that occurs in all decision‐making, so practical implications are that its affects on self and other concepts need to be understood. To establish equalising and non‐polarised interrelationships between “employer” and “worker” and to negate the line between management and employee, exercises in recognition of mutual causation such as servant leadership practises can be introduced.Originality/valueUnparalleled synthesis of seemingly divergent theoretical and practical studies, this paper is a valuable ontological and epistemological tool for ongoing investigation into complexity theory, including self and other organisation.

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Section: Neither Self Nor Other; Neither Master Nor Slave: Hegel' Relationships Of Middlesmentioning

confidence: 99%

To have to halve to have: “Being” in the middle in changing time's space

Lapp¹,

Carr

2006

Journal of Organizational Change Management

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“…I have argued elsewhere that no system empowers the oppressed or the marginalized as does Hegel's. [39] The Absolute, like the master, claims to be all of reality. It denies anything of significance outside itself and marginalizes what it cannot accept.…”

Section: -Iv-mentioning

confidence: 99%

Hegel, Antigone, and Women

Kain¹

2002

Owl of Minerva

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When Hegel turns to a treatment of culture in Chapter VI of the Phenomenology-as anyone who has read his early writings would expect[1]-he begins with the ancient Greek polis. There the human spirit first fully emancipated itself from nature as it had not, in Hegel's opinion, in Egypt; yet it was still in perfect harmony and balance with the natural. In Hegel's view, this was an age of beauty that produced a social community and an ethical life where citizens were free and at home. What is a bit surprising, though, is that in the Phenomenology Hegel does not begin his treatment of the ancient world with the heroes of Homer, the philosophers of Athens, or even with the general cultural perspective of men. He starts, in the section entitled "The Ethical Order," with Antigone and the perspective of women. It is quite true that the perspective of Antigone and of Greek women is constructed from the perspective of men, the perspective of Sophocles and of Hegel himself, nevertheless, it is still rather surprising that Hegel begins with Antigone. What does this mean? Could it mean that when we arrive at Greece, quintessentially the land of the master, Hegel insists on beginning with the slave? Is it fair to see Antigone as like the Hegelian slave? Many scholars-for example, Mills, Ravven, O'Brien, and Oliver-reject such a notion.[2] Nevertheless, Antigone is subordinate to Creon and does end up subverting him-much as the slave does the master. If we admit that women are like the slave, this would tend to suggest that while dominated and oppressed they will ultimately subvert the master, emerge as an equally significant principle, and move us toward a higher development of culture.[3] Could Hegel really be suggesting this sort of thing about women? We will be pushed toward such a conclusion if we decide that Antigone is like the slave. But the question as to why we begin with Antigone is even more complicated than this. Oliver argues that, after the section on the Ethical Order, women are simply left behind in the Phenomenology-they are never resuscitated and are not preserved in later stages of the dialectical movement.[4] I think that without a doubt women are not preserved or resuscitated adequately in the later stages of the Phenomenology, or in Hegel's thought in general, but I do not think that they are simply and completely left behind. Earlier, in Chapter V of the Phenomenology, Hegel took up a discussion of the Sittlichkeit of the ancient polis in order to contrast it to the sort of Moralität that had developed in the modern world. Moralität begins with Socrates[5] and reaches its high point in Kant. Moralität is rational and reflective morality. Individuals must themselves rationally decide what is moral and do it because reason tells them that it is the right thing to do. On the other hand, Sittlichkeit is best represented, for Hegel, in the Greek polis before the rise of Socratic Moralität. Sittlichkeit is ethical behavior grounded in custom and tradition and developed through habit and imitation in accordance...

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The Compatibility of Hegelian Recognition and Morality with the Ethics of Care

Molas

2019

Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology

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Self-consciousness, the other and Hegel's dialectic of recognition

Cited by 7 publications

References 0 publications

To have to halve to have: “Being” in the middle in changing time's space

To have to halve to have: “Being” in the middle in changing time's space

Hegel, Antigone, and Women

The Compatibility of Hegelian Recognition and Morality with the Ethics of Care

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