Self as a default target in thinking about traits

Karylowski, Jerzy J.; Ranieri, Joseph F.

doi:10.1080/15298860600867408

Cited by 9 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 31 publications

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“…For instance, research shows that, compared to our descriptions of other people, self-descriptions tend to include more privileged, unobservable characteristics – e.g., a person’s internal state such as feeling of joy or shame – that are evident to the individual but more difficult for an external observer to ascertain ( McGuire and McGuire, 1988 ; Prentice, 1990 ; Andersen et al, 1998 ; Vazire and Mehl, 2008 ; Vazire, 2010 ). A similar pattern of results has been demonstrated for accessibility of unobservable and observable aspects of self-descriptions ( Karylowski and Ranieri, 2006 ; Mrozinski and Karylowski, 2011 ; Karylowski and Mrozinski, 2017 ). Specifically, making self-judgments on trait-labels preceded by a verb referring to an internal perspective, such as feel (e.g., feels happy, feels sophisticated, etc.)…”

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 80%

“…Without such resolution incompatibility between the mental representations of self and mental representations of others would be likely to hinder one’s ability to use self as a guide or a point of comparison in making judgments about other people (Karylowski et al, 2000; Karylowski and Ranieri, 2006). It could also result in biased comparative self-other judgments because different definitions of the same characteristics (more internally based in the case of the perceived self vs. more externally based in the case of the perceived other) would be used when considering one’s own standing vs. the other person’s standing (Niewiarowski and Karylowski, 2008, 2015).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Time Frame Affects Vantage Point in Episodic and Semantic Autobiographical Memory: Evidence from Response Latencies

Karylowski

Mrozinski

2017

Front. Psychol.

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Previous research suggests that, with the passage of time, representations of self in episodic memory become less dependent on their initial (internal) vantage point and shift toward an external perspective that is normally characteristic of how other people are represented. The present experiment examined this phenomenon in both episodic and semantic autobiographical memory using latency of self-judgments as a measure of accessibility of the internal vs. the external perspective. Results confirmed that in the case of representations of the self retrieved from recent autobiographical memories, trait-judgments regarding unobservable self-aspects (internal perspective) were faster than trait judgments regarding observable self-aspects (external perspective). Yet, in the case of self-representations retrieved from memories of a more distant past, judgments regarding observable self-aspects were faster. Those results occurred for both self-representations retrieved from episodic memory and for representations retrieved from the semantic memory. In addition, regardless of the effect of time, greater accessibility of unobservable (vs. observable) self-aspects was associated with the episodic rather than semantic autobiographical memory. Those results were modified by neither declared trait’s self-descriptiveness (yes vs. no responses) nor by its desirability (highly desirable vs. moderately desirable traits). Implications for compatibility between how self and others are represented and for the role of self in social perception are discussed.

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Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 80%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Time Frame Affects Vantage Point in Episodic and Semantic Autobiographical Memory: Evidence from Response Latencies

Karylowski

Mrozinski

2017

Front. Psychol.

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“…Thus, judging unfamiliar others facilitates judging familiar others more than it facilitates judging the self, suggesting spontaneous recruitment of familiar others for the initial judgment (Karylowski et al 2000). The self plays an even smaller role in judging others when task demands highlight its uniqueness or when judging observable (versus unobservable) manifestations of traits (Karylowski & Ranieri 2006). In response, Mussweiler (2003) noted that self-knowledge can still drive inferences about others who differ from the self and suggested that social prediction is still broadly egocentric.…”

Section: Simulation or Social Projectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Spontaneous Inferences, Implicit Impressions, and Implicit Theories

Uleman

Sarıbay

Gonzalez

2008

Annu. Rev. Psychol.

376

269

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People make social inferences without intentions, awareness, or effort, i.e., spontaneously. We review recent findings on spontaneous social inferences (especially traits, goals, and causes) and closely related phenomena. We then describe current thinking on some of the most relevant processes, implicit knowledge, and theories. These include automatic and controlled processes and their interplay; embodied cognition, including mimicry; and associative versus rule-based processes. Implicit knowledge includes adult folk theories, conditions of personhood, self-knowledge to simulate others, and cultural and social class differences. Implicit theories concern Bayesian networks, recent attribution research, and questions about the utility of the disposition-situation dichotomy. Developmental research provides new insights. Spontaneous social inferences include a growing array of phenomena, but they have been insufficiently linked to other phenomena and theories. We hope the links suggested in this review begin to remedy this.

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“…As a result, compared to representations of others, representations of self tend to be skewed toward internal, unobservable as opposed to external, observable characteristics. This has been demonstrated both in terms of the content ( McGuire & McGuire, 1986 ;Pronin, Kruger, Savitsky, & Ross, 2001 ) and in terms of accessibility of such representations (Andersen & Ross, 1985;Karylowski & Ranieri, 2006 ). In addition, compared to other judgments, self judgments are more accurate for traits that are relatively unobservable, but not for highly observable traits ( Vazire, 2010 ).…”

mentioning

confidence: 96%

“…Trait labels are frequently ambiguous with respect to the distinction between internal and observable versus external and unobservable characteristics. Accordingly, Karylowski and associates (Karylowski & Ranieri, 2006 ;Niewiarowski & Karylowski, 2008 ;Mrozinski & Karylowski, 2011 ) have proposed that the same trait label might be interpreted diff erently when applied to self compared to when applied to others. For instance, when applied to self judgments, happy will be interpreted primarily in terms of feeling happy .…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Observable and Unobservable Aspects of Traits in Self—Other Comparisons

Niewiarowski

Karylowski

2015

Psychol Rep

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Previous research on absolute trait judgments regarding self and others showed that, compared to self-judgments, other-judgments involve greater focus on external, observable (as opposed to internal, unobservable) aspects of traits. The present research attempted to extend those findings to comparative judgments. In two experiments, Polish undergraduates (N = 144) were asked to perform a series of comparative self-other judgments followed by a series of absolute judgments regarding either the self or another person. The absolute judgments employed the same traits as the comparative judgments but with the trait preceded by a qualifier: either "feels," referring to covert, unobservable aspects of the trait, or "looks," referring to overt, observable aspects. As expected, comparative judgments correlated higher with absolute feels judgments regarding the self and with absolute looks judgments regarding the other than with absolute looks judgments regarding the self and absolute feels judgments regarding the other. This occurred for self-other judgments involving acquaintances but not for self-other judgments involving close friends.

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Self as a default target in thinking about traits

Cited by 9 publications

References 31 publications

Time Frame Affects Vantage Point in Episodic and Semantic Autobiographical Memory: Evidence from Response Latencies

Time Frame Affects Vantage Point in Episodic and Semantic Autobiographical Memory: Evidence from Response Latencies

Spontaneous Inferences, Implicit Impressions, and Implicit Theories

Observable and Unobservable Aspects of Traits in Self—Other Comparisons

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