Self-anchoring and differentiation processes in the minimal group setting.

Cadinu, Maria Rosaria; Rothbart, Myron

doi:10.1037/0022-3514.70.4.661

Cited by 257 publications

(344 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…Because one's self-concept and one's social identity are overlapping cognitive constructs (Smith & Henry, 1996;Smith, Coats, & Walling, 1999), people will tend to use the self-concept as an anchor or evaluative base to form judgments of the group (Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996;Gramzow & Gaertner, 2005;Otten, 2002). People generalize their positive evaluation of self to their evaluation of their group.…”

Section: A Group-serving Judgmentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Psychology of Self‐defense: Self‐Affirmation Theory

Sherman¹,

Cohen²

2006

Advances in Experimental Social Psychology

1,173

1,423

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Section: A Group-serving Judgmentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Psychology of Self‐defense: Self‐Affirmation Theory

Sherman¹,

Cohen²

2006

Advances in Experimental Social Psychology

1,173

1,423

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“…That is, minimal group settings may create an association between the new in-group and the self. The associative evaluation of the self may then transfer to the new in-group (see also Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996;Gramzow & Gaertner, 2005;Greenwald & Banaji, 1995;Otten & Wentura, 2001). Given that most people have positive associative evaluations of the self (Bosson et al, 2000;Greenwald & Farnham, 2000;Koole et al, 2001), this evaluative transfer should lead to more positive associative evaluations of the in-group as compared with the out-group.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Given that participants usually have little or no declarative knowledge regarding such minimal groups, this finding may appear somewhat surprising. From the perspective of EC, however, one could argue that minimal group settings are sufficient to create an association between the new in-group and the self, which, in turn, should lead to an associative transfer of implicit self-evaluations to the new in-group (see also Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996;Gramzow & Gaertner, 2005;Greenwald & Banaji, 1995;Otten & Wentura, 2001; for a review, see Otten, 2003). Thus, given that most people's implicit self-evaluation is highly positive (Bosson et al, 2000;Greenwald & Farnham, 2000;Koole et al, 2001), the association between self and in-group may be sufficient to produce an implicit preference for in-groups over out-groups in minimal group settings.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Associative and propositional processes in evaluation: An integrative review of implicit and explicit attitude change.

Gawronski

Bodenhausen²

2006

Psychological Bulletin

2,142

167

2,441

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A central theme in recent research on attitudes is the distinction between deliberate, "explicit" attitudes and automatic, "implicit" attitudes. The present article provides an integrative review of the available evidence on implicit and explicit attitude change that is guided by a distinction between associative and propositional processes. Whereas associative processes are characterized by mere activation independent of subjective truth or falsity, propositional reasoning is concerned with the validation of evaluations and beliefs. The proposed associative-propositional evaluation (APE) model makes specific assumptions about the mutual interplay of the 2 processes, implying several mechanisms that lead to symmetric or asymmetric changes in implicit and explicit attitudes. The model integrates a broad range of empirical evidence and implies several new predictions for implicit and explicit attitude change.Keywords: attitude change, cognitive consistency, dual-process models, evaluative conditioning, implicit measures If eras of psychological research can be characterized in terms of general ideas, a major theme of the current era is probably the notion of automaticity. Many aspects of human behavior that have previously been assumed to have their roots in higher order processes of deliberate reasoning are now viewed as resulting from automatic processes that may occur spontaneously and outside of people's awareness or control (Bargh, 1997;Moors & De Houwer, 2006). This perspective is also dominant in contemporary research on attitudes, in which deliberate, "explicit" attitudes are often contrasted with automatic, "implicit" attitudes (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Petty, Fazio, & Briñol, in press;Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000; Wittenbrink & Schwarz, in press). Whereas the former are usually equated with deliberative, self-reported evaluations, the latter are typically inferred from people's performance on response latency measures, such as the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) or sequential priming tasks (Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995;Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 1997).Even though previous models effectively account for the differential impact of implicit and explicit attitudes on spontaneous and deliberate behavior (e.g., Strack & Deutsch, 2004;Wilson et al., 2000), theories of attitude change still face a considerable asymmetry in integrating the available evidence. Contemporary models of persuasion have been very successful in explaining the influence of different kinds of message cues on self-reported explicit evaluations (Chen & Chaiken, 1999;Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999;Petty & Wegener, 1999; for a review, see Visser & Cooper, 2003). However, changes in implicit attitudes are still largely unexplained. This shortfall has its roots in at least two conceptual issues. First, several models of attitude change do not distinguish between implicit and explicit attitudes in the first place but treat attitudes as a unitary construct (e.g., Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989...

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“…Researchers from the motivational perspective have argued that people make group-serving judgments to help protect and enhance self-esteem (Abrams & Hogg, 1988;Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Researchers from the cognitive perspective have argued that group-serving judgments occur because the self serves as an anchoring basis for judgments of one's group (Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996;Otten, 2002). What ties these different approaches together is the emphasis on the role of the self in group-serving judgments.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Is There an "I" in "Team"? The Role of the Self in Group-Serving Judgments.

Sherman¹,

Kim²

2005

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

114

111

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Why do people make judgments that favor their groups, attributing outcomes to internal factors to a greater extent when their group succeeds than when their group fails? The present research demonstrates that group-serving judgments serve a self-protective function. In Study 1, participants in team sports competitions made more internal team attributions after experiencing victory than defeat; this groupserving bias was eliminated among those who completed an affirmation of personal values. Study 2 replicated Study 1 and found that affirmed people were less likely to use their self-judgments as an anchor for judgments about the group. Study 2 also found that self-affirmation secured feelings of being a worthy group member, and this was associated with the reduction of group-serving judgments. The present research examines the motivational factors that promote, reduce, link, and separate self-serving and group-serving judgments.

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Self-anchoring and differentiation processes in the minimal group setting.

Cited by 257 publications

References 34 publications

The Psychology of Self‐defense: Self‐Affirmation Theory

The Psychology of Self‐defense: Self‐Affirmation Theory

Associative and propositional processes in evaluation: An integrative review of implicit and explicit attitude change.

Is There an "I" in "Team"? The Role of the Self in Group-Serving Judgments.

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