2014
DOI: 10.1017/s1752971914000347
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Selectorate theory, the democratic peace, and public goods provision

Abstract: We show that without a few peculiar modeling choices that are not justified by the core assumptions of the theory, selectorate theory neither unambiguously predicts the democratic peace nor that leaders of more inclusive regimes will rely upon the provision of public goods to remain in office, though they may be more likely to provide club goods. We illustrate these claims using relatively simple models that incorporate the core assumptions of their theory, while avoiding modeling choices we believe to be less… Show more

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Cited by 18 publications
(10 citation statements)
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“…Following Bueno de Mesquita et al, I define an incumbent’s winning coalition as the subset of the population who have a say in choosing a government’s leadership whose support is necessary for her to retain office. I further assume that one of the principle ways an incumbent maintains the support of her winning coalition is by allocating economic resources to their preferred policies (Arena and Nicoletti 2014).…”
Section: The Political Cost Of War Mobilizationmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Following Bueno de Mesquita et al, I define an incumbent’s winning coalition as the subset of the population who have a say in choosing a government’s leadership whose support is necessary for her to retain office. I further assume that one of the principle ways an incumbent maintains the support of her winning coalition is by allocating economic resources to their preferred policies (Arena and Nicoletti 2014).…”
Section: The Political Cost Of War Mobilizationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Second, while all citizens benefit from the military expenditures required to provide the public good of national security (Olson 1965), the public and members of the military have personal reasons to assess military spending beyond what is required for national security differently. Military spending over and above the level necessary to provide national security crowds out consumption spending popular among the public (Fordham and Walker 2005) but finances private benefits and club goods for members of the military (on the link between club goods and political survival, see Arena and Nicoletti 2014). These private and club benefits include, but are not limited to, the salaries of members of the military, access to goods and services at reduced price at base or post exchanges, and free or subsidized housing.…”
Section: The Political Cost Of War Mobilizationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Private goods include specific benefits for a smaller support group (i.e. the selectorate) while public goods include broader benefits for the public at large (Arena & Nicoletti, 2014). Using the selectorate theory, it is argued that the extent to which evidence is used and how evidence is 'selectively' used is often dependent upon whether MPs' political chances are affected by the issues being deliberated and the factors (including evidence) influencing such deliberations.…”
Section: Background To the System Of Evidence Use In Parliaments In Africamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…With public policies, adoption depends on political feasibility, which often includes factors, such as public support for the policies, pressure from interested and affected parties and their organizations, and political negotiations in legislative bodies. [74][75][76][77] With private initiatives, adoption depends on pressures from outside the organization and sometimes on pressures from within. [78][79][80] Implementation of an initiative is affected by numerous factors, including the financial and organizational capabilities of the implementing actor to monitor and enforce compliance.…”
Section: A Tripartite Frameworkmentioning
confidence: 99%