Selecting Your Inflation Targeters: Background and Performance of Monetary Policy Committee Members

Farvaque, Étienne; Hammadou, Hakim; Stanek, Piotr

doi:10.1111/j.1468-0475.2010.00520.x

Cited by 43 publications

(23 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…Information and former professional positions seem to play a role, too: Göhlmann and Vaubel (2007) reveal that inflation preferences of central bankers are driven by their former occupation (the results are confirmed by Farvaque et al, 2011). Evidence in a similar vein is presented by Dreher et al (2009) who show that a leader's professional background, e.g.…”

Section: Compared To Government Msps Opposition Msps In Poor States supporting

confidence: 66%

Revenue Autonomy Preference in German State Parliaments

et al. 2013

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Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW research prompt ly avai la ble to other eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW. 1 Revenue Autonomy Preference in German State ParliamentsFriedrich Heinemann* (ZEW Mannheim and University of Heidelberg)Eckhard Janeba (University of Mannheim)Marc-Daniel Moessinger (ZEW Mannheim)Christoph Schröder (ZEW Mannheim)October 2013 AbstractFiscal federalism in Germany is characterized by lacking sub-national tax autonomy and intensive fiscal equalization. Due to a sunset clause, the current equalization system has to be renegotiated by the year 2019. Against this backdrop, this contribution studies the reform preferences of members of state parliaments. The study makes use of a self-conducted survey among the members of all 16 German state parliaments. It tests to which extent the preferences of these veto players for tax autonomy and fiscal equalization are driven by states' self-interest, party ideology and individual characteristics. The results are helpful to understand the political-economic constraints of federal reforms. They indicate that besides the individual ideological position higher state wealth and lower debt levels are linked to larger reform support. Therefore, a promising new reform would have to address budgetary legacies like high pre-existing debt.JEL Classification: H63, H74, H77

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Section: Compared To Government Msps Opposition Msps In Poor States supporting

confidence: 66%

Revenue Autonomy Preference in German State Parliaments

et al. 2013

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“…Dreher, Lamla, Lein, and Somogyi (2009) provide evidence that the professional background of the head of government matters for the implementation of market-liberalizing reforms. Similarly, Göhlmann and Vaubel (2007) as well as Farvaque, Hammadou, andStanek (2009, 2011) demonstrate that the educational and professional background as well as the gender of decision makers in monetary policy councils is relevant for inflation.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Voters prefer more qualified mayors, but does it matter for public finances? Evidence for Germany

Freier

Thomasius

2015

Int Tax Public Finance

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. This paper studies the importance of politician's qualification, in terms of education and experience, for fiscal outcomes. The analysis is based on a large panel for 2,031 German municipalities for which we have collected information on municipal budgets as well as the election results and qualification levels of mayoral candidates. We principally use a Regression Discontinuity Design focusing on close elections to estimate causal effects. We find that mayors with prior experience in office indeed tend to reduce the level of local public debt, lower total municipal expenditures and decrease the local taxes. In contrast, the education level of the mayor exerts no significant effects on the overall fiscal performance of the municipality. The results are partly surprising as both education and experience are shown to matter greatly in the electoral success of mayoral candidates. Terms of use: Documents in

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“…The preference shock i may represent idiosyncratic central banker preferences that are not fully known by the social planner either because the policymakers do not clearly reveal them or because of a high turnover rate. These idiosyncrasies can for instance stem from the policymakers career background -as suggested by Riboni and Ruge-Murcia (2008) and Farvaque et al (2011) -or the nature of their membership in the MPC (whether they are internal or external members). In the case of a monetary union where the MPC of a common central bank is composed of national representatives, these idiosyncrasies might reflect the member countries' heterogeneous economic situation.…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 98%

Optimal Conservatism and Collective Monetary Policymaking under Uncertainty

Hefeker

Zimmer

2014

Open Econ Rev

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We study how the optimal degree of conservatism relates to decisionmaking procedures in a Monetary Policy Committee (MPC). In our framework, central bank conservatism is required to attenuate the volatility of monetary decisions generated by the presence of uncertainty about the committee members' output objective. We show how this need for conservatism varies according to the number of MPC members, the MPC's composition as well as its decision rule. Moreover, we find that extra central bank conservatism is required when there is ambiguity about the MPC's true decision rule.

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Selecting Your Inflation Targeters: Background and Performance of Monetary Policy Committee Members

Cited by 43 publications

References 32 publications

Revenue Autonomy Preference in German State Parliaments

Revenue Autonomy Preference in German State Parliaments

Voters prefer more qualified mayors, but does it matter for public finances? Evidence for Germany

Optimal Conservatism and Collective Monetary Policymaking under Uncertainty

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