Selecting Judges in Poland and Germany: Challenges to the Rule of law in Europe and Propositions for a new Approach to Judicial Legitimacy

Sanders, Anne E.; Danwitz, Luc von

doi:10.1017/s2071832200022872

Cited by 13 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…This point may be stronger yet in processes of 'presidentialization' of politics (Rosanvallon 2015), currently happening in several democracies, where Parliaments have lost much of their power to control the executive. In some contexts, this shift of power towards the executive goes with clear attempts to muzzle the judiciary, sometimes under the pretext of providing it more democratic legitimacy (Sanders and von Danwitz 2018). But separation of powers entails that at least one of these powers is sufficiently independent from the others.…”

Section: Accountability Deficitsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In this respect, their independence should not be total. They should be accountable if not to the whole citizenry, at least to its elected representatives, which matters for their democratic legitimacy (see Fiss 1993; Russo 2019: 15‐16; Sanders and von Danwitz 2018).…”

Section: What Do We Expect From Judges?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Thus, it is not true that randomly selected judges would necessarily escape any form of accountability. Accountability is not reducible to reconduction mechanisms; it can also take a more deliberative form, such as an obligation to publicly provide reasons for one’s actions (Mansbridge 2009: 370; Sanders and von Danwitz 2018: 808). Then, once we take this wider view on accountability, it is a matter of finding the proper institutional tools to make judges accountable without jeopardizing their independence.…”

Section: Objections To Random Selectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Selecting Constitutional Judges Randomly

Vandamme

Hutt

2020

Swiss Political Sci Review

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This article discusses from the perspective of democratic theory an innovative proposal for the selection of constitutional, supreme court, or federal judges that aims at combining the values of expertise and political independence. It consists in combining a certification processselecting a pool of properly qualified candidateswith a random selection among this pool. We argue that such selection procedure would better respect the separation of powers and the specific legitimacy of courts, and we champion this two-stage mechanism visa -vis other, more traditionally employed, selection procedures. We then deal with a diversity of objections to our proposal and conclude by taking stock of both its virtues and limitations. Zusammenfassung: In diesem Artikel wird aus demokratietheoretischer Sicht ein innovativer Vorschlag f€ ur die Auswahl von Verfassungsrichtern, Richtern des Obersten Gerichtshofs oder Bundesrichtern diskutiert, der darauf abzielt, die Werte der Fachkompetenz und der politischen Unabh€ angigkeit zu verbinden. Er besteht in der Kombination eines Zertifizierungsverfahrens-der Auswahl eines Pools von entsprechend qualifizierten Kandidaten-mit einer Zufallsauswahl aus diesem Pool. Wir argumentieren, dass ein solches Auswahlverfahren die Gewaltenteilung und die spezifische Legitimit€ at von Gerichten besser respektiert, und wir bef€ urworten diesen zweistufigen Mechanismus gegen€ uber anderen, eher traditionell angewandten Auswahlverfahren. Anschließend setzen wir uns mit einer Vielzahl von Einw€ anden gegen unseren Vorschlag auseinander und ziehen abschließend eine Bilanz sowohl seiner Vorz€ uge als auch seiner Grenzen. R esum e: Cet article examine, du point de vue de la th eorie de la d emocratie, une proposition novatrice pour la s election des juges constitutionnels, f ed eraux ou suprêmes, qui vise a combiner les valeurs d'expertise et d'ind ependance politique. Elle consiste a combiner un processus de certification-pr es election d'un ensemble de candidats poss edant les qualifications requises-avec un tirage au sort parmi ces candidats eligibles. Nous soutenons qu'une telle proc edure de s election respecterait mieux la s eparation des pouvoirs et la l egitimit e sp ecifique des cours de justice, et nous d efendons ce m ecanisme en comparaison avec d'autres proc edures de s election plus traditionnellement utilis ees. Nous abordons ensuite les diverses objections a notre proposition et concluons en faisant le point sur ses vertus et ses limites.

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Section: Accountability Deficitsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: What Do We Expect From Judges?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Objections To Random Selectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Selecting Constitutional Judges Randomly

Vandamme

Hutt

2020

Swiss Political Sci Review

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“…Sanders & von Danwitz (2018) at 785; Vincze (2014) at 212, when it stated that "The judgment of the ECJ did not even mention the world judicial independence".…”

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confidence: 99%

Judicial Independence: European Standards, ECtHR Criteria and the Reshuffling Plan of the Judiciary Bodies in Poland

Mastracci¹

2019

AJL

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In Poland, after the Parliamentary election of 2015, the executive propelled a series of interlock reforms of the judicial bodies. In the first place, the way forward was marked by a compound diatribe concerning the Constitutional Tribunal, the essence of the dispute was about the mandate's legitimacy of three sitting judges after the Court's reinterpretation of the K 34/15 ruling that ended up on 2 December by the election of five new judges appointed ex novo by the ruling party. Afterwards, the attention shifted towards the rethinking of the National Council of Judiciary (KRS), asserting, firstly, the unconstitutionality of its statute and, subsequently, planning a new method of appointment for the judicial members. Ultimately, the spotlight turned in the direction of the Supreme Courts judges where the most spectacular sweep was the provision aimed at lowering the retirement age for the sitting judges on a scheme similar to the proposal made by the Hungarian government in 2011 where raised their voices respectively, the Hungarian Constitutional Court, the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights, where the judicial independence standard played a minor role on their reasoning.

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“…Sanders & von Danwitz (2018) at 785; Vincze (2014) at 212, when it stated that -The judgment of the ECJ did not even mention the world judicial independence‖.Athens Journal of LawJuly 2019…”

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confidence: 99%

Untitled

2019

AJL

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Mission ATINER is a World Non-Profit Association of Academics and Researchers based in Athens. ATINER is an independent Association with a Mission to become a forum where Academics and Researchers from all over the world can meet in Athens, exchange ideas on their research and discuss future developments in their disciplines, as well as engage with professionals from other fields. Athens was chosen because of its long history of academic gatherings, which go back thousands of years to Plato's Academy and Aristotle's Lyceum. Both these historic places are within walking distance from ATINER"s downtown offices. Since antiquity, Athens was an open city. In the words of Pericles, Athens"…is open to the world, we never expel a foreigner from learning or seeing". ("Pericles" Funeral Oration", in Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War). It is ATINER"s mission to revive the glory of Ancient Athens by inviting the World Academic Community to the city, to learn from each other in an environment of freedom and respect for other people"s opinions and beliefs. After all, the free expression of one"s opinion formed the basis for the development of democracy, and Athens was its cradle. As it turned out, the Golden Age of Athens was in fact, the Golden Age of the Western Civilization. Education and (Re)searching for the "truth" are the pillars of any free (democratic) society. This is the reason why Education and Research are the two core words in ATINER"s name.

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Selecting Judges in Poland and Germany: Challenges to the Rule of law in Europe and Propositions for a new Approach to Judicial Legitimacy

Cited by 13 publications

References 9 publications

Selecting Constitutional Judges Randomly

Selecting Constitutional Judges Randomly

Judicial Independence: European Standards, ECtHR Criteria and the Reshuffling Plan of the Judiciary Bodies in Poland

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